Beijing accuses Washington of deliberately devaluing the dollar to slow China’s ambitious economic expansion plan by rendering Chinese products more expensive to American and world consumers and by reducing the value of China’s investments in U.S. securities.  Washington, on the other hand, accuses China of artificially undervaluing the Yuan in an effort to pursue an aggressive export-driven growth policy that can destabilize world markets in the long run.

The reality is that the US-China relationship is very complex; it is governed by two forces pulling in opposite directions:

A) Economic interdependency: China needs to sustain its economic expansion strategy through unfettered access to the U.S. consumers’ market, and America needs to sustain federal obligations and commitments through debt by encouraging China’s investments in U.S. government securities.

B) Economic competition: China has the ambition to become a superpower that can rival the United States on the world’s stage, and America desires to contain China’s expanding influence to preserve the international order it helped design.

As long as these two forces are at equilibrium, the U.S.-China relationship can develop on a win-win basis with tremendous benefits to the world community and the global economy.  Unfortunately, current data clearly point to a trend towards imbalance favoring China. Let me explain.

Is Economic Interdependency a Myth?

In 2009, U.S. federal spending on social security, unemployment/welfare, Medicare, Medicaid, and interest on the national debt was equal to the total revenues of the U.S. government. In other words, all other U.S. government programs (e.g., Defense, Agriculture, Education, Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Justice, State, etc.) – and the funding of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – are currently being paid for through debt advanced to the United States by China.

In summary, China is financing almost 100 percent of the U.S. government’s spending outside of welfare/entitlements/debt interest, including the constitutionally mandated top priorities of the U.S. government: defense policy, monetary policy and foreign policy. This financial dependency on China has already grown further in 2010 and is expected to skyrocket in the coming years.

Some analysts argue that this dependency on China is of no threat to U.S. national interest because China has “no other alternative” than the U.S. market: only the United States can consume Chinese-made products at the rate China’s needs to sustain its exports-driven economic growth policy; and, only the U.S. government is capable (it owns the U.S. dollar, the world’s dominant currency) and willing (desiring to keep its deficit-driven spending) to absorb through debt China’s growing U.S. dollar-based wealth without major political and/or economic backlash. In other words, the U.S. government can go on with its deficit-driven spending without worries about China “pulling the plug” anytime soon.

While this interdependency is today true, it is quickly moving in a different direction that is not advantageous to the United States:

• First, the Chinese domestic market has the real potential to become a sustaining force to China’s continued economic growth. Already the world’s second largest economy, China has growing upper and middle classes that are pushing domestic consumption upwards.  While in theory this trend presents an opportunity for U.S. companies to increase their exports to China, in reality, Chinese companies are increasingly directing their products to their domestic market at the expense of foreign imports. Preserving a lower value for the Yuan strengthens this trend by rendering foreign made goods priced in U.S. dollars more expensive.

• Second, emerging economies are on the rise around the world and are increasingly providing fresh opportunities for international investments. A cash-rich China is already overtaking a debt-burdened America. Chinese investments are on the rise in every continent around the world.

In short, the seemingly interdependent economic environment is already imbalanced in favor of China.

What happens when, by 2025 or 2030, as international economists and financial experts predict, China surpasses the United States to become the world’s largest economy, if America continues down the road of deficit spending and debt piling?

Economic Competition: At Major Crossroads
China is pursuing economic, financial and trade agreements worldwide much more aggressively and more successfully than the United States. Flush with cash, China has already secured treaties with resource-rich countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Central/South America:

Latin America: The Chinese government made it quite clear earlier this year that it seeks a comprehensive development of its relations with Latin America. China has already secured oil contracts, defense sales agreements and joint ventures in Latin America.  Furthermore, approximately 50 percent of China’s non-financial FDI (foreign direct investment) has been in Latin America, mainly Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.

Asia: With America preoccupied with terrorism, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, China has increased its presence in Asia at the expense of the United States. China’s stronger relations are most visible in the economic sector. In Indonesia, for example, China is now a major financier of mega projects, a role that had been played in the past by international institutions like the World Bank and countries like Japan and the United States.

Africa: “China has become the alternative partner for Africa. In the last 10 years, Africa with assistance from China has been able to do much more with less because Chinese technology is much cheaper compared to that of the West that Africa relied on before,” states Leonard Kimani, the director of the economic sector at the National Economic Social Council (NESC), the think-tank that advises the Kenyan government. Soon after taking office, South African President Jacob Zuma went to China in August 2010 to discuss South Africa-China relations, including focused discussions on nuclear cooperation and Chinese investment in South Africa’s infrastructure, such as railways. Zuma defended Chinese investments as “… not to colonize, but to help Africa stand on its own and work together with China.”

Middle East: In November of this year, China and Turkey established a “strategic cooperative relationship” at all levels – military, economic and political. In 2010, China has replaced the European Union as Iran’s largest trade partner, oil purchaser and foreign investor. China is already one of the biggest winners of Iraq’s oil contracts.

This overall trend in China’s expanding economic, political and military relationships is expected to grow further in the coming years. Faced with this reality, what “leverage” does the United States have to achieve its economic competitive objective?

A)    Energy
Energy is the lifeblood of the global economy. Without unfettered access to sources of energy, China’s ambitious goal of becoming a superpower in twenty-odd years cannot be realized. Oil and gas are still the “oxygen” for global energy today. U.S. Department of Energy statistics show the following:

• Oil: approximately 87 percent of oil reserves outside Canada, the United States, Russia and China exist in Muslim countries.

• Gas: approximately 61 percent of gas reserves exist in the Muslim Middle Eastern countries. In Eurasia, with about 10 percent of the world’s reserves, Russia has 62 percent and approximately 37 percent exist in Muslim countries or countries with a majority Muslim population (e.g., Kazakhstan). In Africa, with about 9 percent of the world’s reserves, 87 percent exist in Muslim countries like Libya and Algeria, and countries with Muslim majorities, like Nigeria. In Asia and Oceania, with about 3 percent of the world’s reserves, China is the largest holder. Outside China, 43 percent of gas reserves in this region are in Muslim countries like Indonesia and Malaysia.

B)    Trade Routes

Approximately 90 percent of world trade is transacted today by sea through shipping, with about 70 percent of it transiting through the Indian Ocean. China today, lacking a powerful navy, has to rely on the U.S. Navy to keep open these shipping lanes, which are of vital importance to its trade and economic expansion. A close look at the countries along the Indian Ocean – eastern coast of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, East Asia and Oceania – along with shipping gateways such as the Suez Canal, Bab El Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, and Lombok Strait, that connect the Indian Ocean to the rest of the world, reveals the importance of Muslim countries and countries with large Muslim populations.

In short, how the United States manages its outreach to the Muslim world becomes of strategic importance to America’s economic competitiveness vis-à-vis China in the 21st century.

The Real Stakes
The festering problem of North Korea must be viewed and dealt with in light of this background.  The current U.S. policy towards North Korea – a regime of sanctions on the one hand and beefing up military arrangements in the region on the other – has immediate benefits in terms of military sales and bilateral trade matters with countries of the region. But it also exacerbates the U.S. Government deficit by driving military expenditures upward. This is a small price to pay as long the overall strategic outlook for U.S.-China relations remains at a point of equilibrium, wherein any broader conflict caused by North Korea would bring more harm to China’s strategic position than to that of the United States.

The trend as I described it earlier, however, clearly points to a state of imbalance in the strategic relationship favoring China, leaving the United States with the possibility of facing a “double jeopardy” if it does not act soon to reverse it. If the United States keeps in place its current policy towards North Korea without drastically altering the course of its global policies, more especially towards the Muslim world, it will be in a much weaker position to influence policy in the Korean theatre 15-20 years from now when China becomes the world’s largest economy.

Even countries like South Korea and Japan will then seek greater accommodation with China at the expense of the United States. Finally, if the United States also fails to bring under control its upward spiraling budget deficits, then by the time China’s economy surpasses that of the United States, the U.S. government will be under so much debt over the next ten to fifteen years that it will practically lose all flexibility in governing its international affairs. Is China applying lessons from America’s playbook against the Soviet Union? By driving the Soviet Union bankrupt, the United States won the Cold War and helped bring about the end of the Russian empire.

Cultural Intelligence matters!

The Middle East has undergone a sea change at the geostrategic level, presenting U.S. policymakers with a new set of serious challenges. Today’s Middle East order is being shaped by these fundamental realities:

• Egypt and Jordan are no longer key shapers of regional politics and are fast becoming irrelevant to the emerging new order in the Middle East.
• Saudi Arabia today is more of a liability than an asset for the United States; while its security and stability remain a U.S. top priority, its Wahhabi identity is the source of its vulnerability.
• Israel remains the most powerful regional power but has been “relatively weakened” by the emergence of an asymmetrical strategic environment in the region.
• Iran, which had been relatively “dormant” from 1979 to 2004, emerged since 2005 as a new regional player to be reckoned with. Iran today projects its influence throughout the Middle East and Central Asia region of the world.
• Turkey, which was for decades secular-driven and Europe focused (while being a strong ally of Israel), has in recent years built a strategy focused on the Middle East and Central Asia rather than Europe. By recapturing its Muslim identity and making it a basis for its new national security strategy, Turkey reversed its pro-Israel stance of the past and positioned itself as a new independent and engaged regional player.
• Iran and Turkey are forging closer relations and fast becoming the “key shapers” of Muslim opinion and power (Shiite and Sunni respectively) in the region.
• China, which has the ambition and long-term potential of becoming a superpower that could rival the United States in ways not even the Soviet Union could achieve in its heydays, is aggressively seeking oil and gas agreements in the Muslim dominated region of the Middle East and Central Asia.

The emergence of Turkey and the entry of China as new players in the region has driven the last nail in the coffin of the old Mideast order and ushered a new era of power politics, with the Middle East and Central Asia becoming practically one, interdependent and inseparable geostrategic theater. Given this new Middle East order, what should the United States be doing to safeguard its vital and strategic interests in the region?

To design a new approach to the region that would have resonance with the key players and be ultimately successful in preserving its vital interests, the United States needs to fully understand and assimilate “why and how” this shift has taken place in the region.

I will attempt in this series to shed some light at the root developments that have caused the demise of the old Mideast order, the birth of the new order and its significant impact on U.S. strategic interests, and the viable policy options at the disposal of the United States, given the new realities of the region.

The Old Mideast Order and the Containment of the Soviet Union

The Cold War was the most defining phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century.  In its efforts to contain Soviet influence around the globe, the United States designed a Mideast policy aimed at denying Soviet access to that oil and gas-rich region of the world. Oil security became the most important pillar supporting U.S. policy in the Middle East with Iran as the key ally in this endeavor since 1953 under the Shah.

The one event that changed fully the equation of power in the region was the1956 Suez Canal crisis, prompted by a tripartite military operation undertaken by Israel, Britain and France. Fearing Soviet penetration of the Middle East oil rich region, the United States responded to the crisis by pressuring Britain, France and Israel to withdraw. This single most important act convinced both Israel and Egypt that a new era had dawned on the Middle East, with the United States asserting itself as the new outside power in the region, eclipsing the old colonial powers of Britain and France. David Ben-Gurion of Israel was much quicker in his response to this new reality and upstaged Egyptian efforts by paving the way for Israel to ultimately become a “second pillar” of security for the United States against the Soviet Union.

U.S. Twin-Pillar Policy: Israel Security and Oil Security

From that point onward, U.S. policy in the Middle East was built on two pillars: the security of Israel and the security of oil. Israel had become an important strategic asset for the United States in its containment strategy of the Soviet Union. Oil security, on the other hand, was of paramount importance to the United States in order to secure the free flow of oil, the lifeblood of the world’s economy.

The Arab-Israeli conflict in its nascent years was considered a “nuisance” at best by the United States. As long as oil security was assured via the strategic relationship with Iran, a non-Arab country that had recognized Israel, the twin-pillar policy was safe. Furthermore, the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab world proved Israel’s military superiority in defeating the combined armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and led to Israel’s occupation of Egypt’s Sinai, Syria’s Golan Heights, and the Palestinian territories of Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank.

Arab governments, having felt humiliated by their defeat in 1967, worked diligently to orchestrate a comeback and reassert their power in a region that was dominated by Israel and Iran – both enjoying close relations with and the strong backing of the United States. The 1973 war, also known as the Yom Kippur War or the October War, was an attempt by Arab governments to do just that. The armies of Egypt and Syria launched a simultaneous and surprise attack aimed at recapturing the Sinai and the Golan Heights. The arms supply by the Soviet Union to Egypt and Syria was answered by the United States organizing a strategic airlift of weapons and military supplies to Israel, which led Saudi Arabia to orchestrate an oil embargo against the United States and the West.

For the first time, the Arab-Israeli conflict had a direct impact on both Israeli security and oil security, thus proving it had the potential to disrupt the U.S. twin-pillar policy. In order to contain this new development, the United States added a third pillar to its Mideast policy: the Peace Process.

U.S. Third-Pillar Policy: the Middle East Peace Process

In the aftermath of the 1973 war and the oil embargo that ensued, the immediate objective of the United States was to ensure that the Arab-Israeli conflict would not jeopardize its twin-pillar policy. If full and comprehensive peace could be achieved between Israel and the Arab world, that would be ideal; however, U.S. policymakers, being quite skeptical of such an outcome in the foreseeable short/midterms, focused their energies on structuring a mechanism called “Process” that would “manage” the Arab-Israeli conflict to achieve three main objectives:

1. Ensure the Israel security pillar by pursuing a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, the latter having been deemed by the United States as the only Arab power with the potential capacity to seriously endanger Israel’s safety. In addition, drawing Egypt closer to the United States through the peace process would deny the Soviet Union a critical ally. Henry Kissinger’s famous quote, “No war without Egypt, no peace without Syria” best illustrates this objective.
2. Safeguard the oil security pillar by creating an environment in the region that would make it easier for Arab oil countries in the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) to resist the persistent calls by Arab nationalists advocating the use of oil as a political weapon against U.S. policy in the region.
3. Keeping both pillars “unlinked,” as separate from each other as possible with no pillar’s challenges endangering the other.

The Peace Process was quite effective in its early days. By 1978, it produced the Camp David Accords establishing “peace” between Israel and Egypt. The fact that the peace between Egypt and Israel was “cold” (because it did not produce the kind of normalized relations expected in a “warm” peace) was relatively inconsequential to U.S. policy-makers; after all, the first objective of the Process was to enhance Israel’s security by neutralizing Egypt’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Peace Process also achieved its second and third objectives by providing the rationale and the comfort zone for Arab oil gulf countries (with the exception of Iraq, which was ruled by Baathist Arab nationalists) to adopt a “politically neutral” oil policy and continue to accept Iran’s unique role in ensuring oil security in the region.

Stay tuned for Part II of this series, subtitled “Oil Security at Risk”

Cultural intelligence matters!

Oil Security Pillar “Shaken”
The region’s single most important event of the last 20-plus years of the twentieth century was the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The overthrow of the Shah’s government by Islamic Revolutionaries in 1979 and its subsequent events, such as the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and the taking of American hostages, resulted in a total and complete breakdown in diplomatic relations between the United States and the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran.

With the loss of Iran as its main ally to ensure oil security, the United States was presented with a difficult dilemma: how to pursue oil security in the Gulf region without resorting to direct U.S. military intervention? The root cause of this dilemma was the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict; any increased direct military intervention on the part of the United States in the Gulf would almost immediately translate into increased pressure on Arab oil Gulf countries to break their “oil neutrality” vis-à-vis the United States. The only two countries in the Gulf that could possibly act as the replacement to Iran and assist the United States in safeguarding its oil security pillar were Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The invasion of Iran in 1980 by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and the eight-year war that followed made it impractical for the United States to choose Iraq as a replacement to the Shah’s Iran.  On the other hand, in the absence of an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Saudi Arabia, which had been agreeable to a low profile American military presence on its territory, was not receptive to the idea of being the replacement of the Shah’s Iran for fear of being perceived by Arab and Muslim populations in the region as a “traitor” to the Arab and Palestinian cause.

Faced with this unpleasant reality, the United States chose to increase its military profile in the region by boosting its naval presence and pursuing military and security agreements with member countries of the newly established Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”). The “profile” increase resulting from the enhanced American direct military presence, though problematic in the long run, was an “acceptable” risk for the United States to take as long as Iraq and Iran were busy fighting each other and not destabilizing the oil region.

The abrupt end to the Iraq-Iran war brought about unilaterally by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988, however, presented the United States with a new challenge in the gulf region – an increasingly assertive Iraq. The invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990 led the United States to construct the biggest military buildup in history with the aim of liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation to safeguard its oil security pillar. The liberation of Kuwait by U.S. troops necessitated a huge increase in U.S. military personnel on Saudi territory, causing an “unwanted and unwelcomed” reaction in the Saudi Kingdom.

Liberation of Kuwait: A Missed Opportunity

If there is one event in the Gulf region that could be considered “the turning point” for U.S. oil security interests, it is the liberation of Kuwait. Let me explain.

With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, reformers in Iran led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani were determined to push their political/economic agenda forward, effectively challenging the “velayat e faqih” system of government. The success of their economic reforms, however, depended heavily on foreign investment in Iran’s infrastructure and industrial base, including oil and gas, and in the absence of normalized relations with the United States, that would not be possible. As soon as Ayatollah Rafsanjani assumed the presidency in 1989, he sought seriously a dialogue with the United States aimed at normalizing relations between both countries. The United States, however, was preoccupied with an increasingly belligerent and aggressive Iraq that ended up invading Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The United States, with the full support of the United Nations and key Arab states, led a multinational force and launched Operation Desert Storm aimed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

With Kuwait liberated, Iranian reformers had then hoped that President George Herbert Walker Bush, when and if re-elected, would be ready and willing to engage in normalization talks. In their calculus, given Iraq’s war waging against its neighbors and the need for long-term security and stability in the Gulf region, the United States would appreciate a potentially positive role by Iran in this equation. Furthermore, Iranian reformers were very aware of the political and cultural pressures the Saudi government was being subjected to by Wahhabis and Salafis due to the heavy presence of American troops on Saudi soil and in the region. Hopes were pinned by Iranian reformers on Bush’s re-election, but William Jefferson Clinton was elected President in 1992.

The Lost Decade and the Growth of al Qaeda

The election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States was seen as a setback by Iranian reformers. In their eyes, President H.W. Bush was a realist and a pragmatist who put the U.S. national interest above special interest, such as that of Israel supporters in Washington. The Clinton Administration, on the other hand, made Israeli security a primary objective, which required a containment of Iranian influence rather than an accommodation of Iranian concerns.

Attempts in the 90s by Rafsanjani to open up to the United States went nowhere because they ran counter to the Clinton Administration’s strategy of dual containment and its regional security policy framework. As a result, the United States missed the opportunity of regaining Iran as a potential partner for its oil security pillar and had to rely instead on increasing its own military presence in the region. This increased U.S. military presence in the Arabian Peninsula put Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and the United States on a head-on collision course and provided the opportunity for al Qaeda to develop a successful strategy aimed at destabilizing the oil security pillar of the United States.

In Part III of this series, subtitled “Israel Security at Risk,” we will address the regional developments and root causes that have transformed the security environment that Israel faces today.

Cultural Intelligence matters!

1. Israel Security: An American Strategic Asset
Having learned from the Suez Canal episode with Britain and France in 1956, Israel shifted its strategic focus to bring it into alignment with the United States: containing Soviet influence in the Middle East region. From that point onward, Israel Security became the second pillar on which the United States built its Mideast policy (the first pillar being Oil Security as discussed in Part I and Part II of this series).

Israel, equipped with superior American weaponry, could defeat Soviet equipped Arab armies and contain militarily Soviet expansionist desires in the Middle East. In contrast with Southeast Asia, the United States did not need to deploy its own troops to contain the Soviet Union; Israel could do it alone. In fact, the Six-Day War in 1967 clearly showed Israeli military superiority over the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria and enabled Israel to occupy the Arab lands of Sinai, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank. From 1956 and until the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1992, Israel Security was of strategic importance to the United States.

What about the Middle East Conflict?
Israel’s narrative of the conflict with Palestinians has always been framed as part of a larger Arab-Israeli conflict: Jewish nationalism against Arab nationalism. Arabs, having rejected the partition of Palestine in 1947, fought the establishment of the State of Israel and lost Arab lands in the 1967 war. From Israel’s perspective, a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict should be based on Israel returning Arab occupied lands (not necessarily all Arab lands) in exchange for obtaining full peace with Arab countries. Palestinian refugees were in Israel’s eyes Arab refugees who would then settle permanently in Arab countries as part of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. The conflict pitted Jewish nationalism against Arab nationalism.

Palestinian statehood was never part of this Israeli narrative.

This Israeli prism, which was fully embraced by U.S. foreign policy makers, explains the actions undertaken by Israel and practically accepted even when not fully supported by the United States from 1967 until the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

Settlement Policy
Settlements in the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war were considered by the Israeli Government as a necessity to consolidate and reinforce the consensus among the key Israeli establishments:

• Security Establishment: Given the lack of strategic geographical depth of the State of Israel, building settlements in the occupied territories enhances Israeli security.
• Religious Establishment: For many religious Israeli Jews, Judea and Samaria are historically Jewish lands that must be reclaimed as quickly as possible through a proactive settlement policy.
• Political Establishment: Political leaders in Israel, irrespective of their party affiliation, have, with very few exceptions, considered the settlement policy as strengthening Israel’s negotiating hand in any future peace talks with the Arabs.

Peace Process
The Arab-Israeli conflict that erupted with the partition of Palestine and its rejection by Arabs was not in its nascent days a top priority for U.S. foreign policy-makers because it had no real impact on its Oil Security Pillar and proved to be incapable of damaging Israel Security. As explained in Part I of this series, the United States introduced the Peace Process as a necessary means to better manage its two-pillar policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the 1973 war launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel. By viewing the conflict through the Israeli prism, the U.S. foreign policy establishment advanced a process aimed at achieving peace between Israel and Arab states that would take into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people – no real talk of Palestinian statehood.

2. Israel Security: Shaky Grounds
Israel Security, as articulated above, was rock solid vis-à-vis the Arab States and an important strategic asset for the United States in the Middle East region. Israeli victory in the 1967 war produced, however, a new subterranean powerful dynamic that has, over a period of two decades, transformed the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict in ways that were not fully assimilated by key Israeli and American policy-makers. Let me explain.

The 1987 Intifada: a New Dynamic
While American and Israeli policy-makers were approaching the peace process in the manner described above, a new dynamic was taking shape among Palestinians in the occupied territories. The occupation awakened Palestinian nationalism as a force distinct from (though still connected to) Arab nationalism.

From 1967 and until the 1987 Intifada or Uprising, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was the main Palestinian entity engaged in fighting Israel. The PLO was in reality an umbrella organization made up of various Palestinian groups. These groups were supported by different Arab governments that often used them as “tools” to settle their own differences (Syria against Iraq, Libya against Egypt, etc.). This structure of the PLO reinforced Israeli and American convictions that the conflict was indeed an Arab-Israeli one and should be viewed and treated as such.

It is this prism that was largely responsible for “blurring” the vision of American and Israeli policy makers and rendered them incapable of realizing that the 1987 Intifada was far more than a simple uprising. Having taken matters into their own hands, Palestinians living in the occupied territories affirmed their own Palestinian nationalism as distinct from Arab nationalism.

Hamas was officially born.

American and Israeli policy makers, however, remained largely oblivious to this new phenomenon. This explains why the Oslo Agreement of 1993 focused on reaching an understanding between Israel and the PLO – totally bypassing the dynamic created by Palestinians in the occupied territories. Indeed, Israeli policymakers believed that an understanding with the PLO based on the latter’s renunciation of terrorism and acceptance of the existence of the State of Israel would help them contain and hopefully bring to an end the state of uprising in the occupied territories and provide new momentum to the Peace Process.

The 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: Birth of Hezbollah
On June 6, 1982, Israel launched a massive military invasion of Lebanon, code named Operation Peace for the Galilee, with the intention of bringing to an end PLO rocket fire and military operations emanating from South Lebanon and targeting northern Israel. Israel’s military campaign against the PLO was very successful, and Israel proved once again its military superiority in the region. Victory, however, produced a totally different dynamic that, by the close of the 20th century, rendered the security environment surrounding Israel much more unstable.

Three key events have contributed to this new environment:

•    The massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in the aftermath of the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bechir Gemayel on September 14, 1982, on the hands of Christian militiamen allied with Israel and under the watchful eyes of the Israel Defense Forces besieging those camps produced a worldwide condemnation of Israel. Arab governments, pressured by their outraged populations, mounted pressure on the U.S. Government to intervene. The United States came to the rescue by deploying U.S. Marines in Lebanon (part of a Multinational Peace Keeping Mission), with the aim of ensuring the security of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps in Beirut and working out a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon.

In so doing, however, the United States inadvertently and unintentionally produced a direct linkage between Oil Security and Israel Security, thus putting at risk its entire Mideast policy. Having suffered two bombings in 1983 (the U.S. Embassy on April 18 and the U.S. Marines Barracks on October 23), the Reagan Administration ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon on February 7, 1984. While this act was deemed by many analysts to constitute a major setback for the United States, it in fact delinked the two pillars of America’s Mideast strategy, enabling the United States to resume its “business as usual” approach to the region.

Lesson: Forces opposing U.S. policy in the region understood that the vulnerability of the U.S. two-pillar strategy resides in “linking” the two pillars.

•    The attacks on the U.S. Embassy and Marine Barracks in Lebanon were carried out by suicide bombers.

Lesson: Suicide bombing presents an effective weapon to overcome the military inferiority of those opposed to U.S. and Israeli policies.

•    Continued Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon, especially South Lebanon, as a means to protect its northern border alienated the Shiite community of Lebanon and gave rise to a new entity: Hezbollah. Hezbollah carried out an aggressive campaign from 1984 to 2000, utilizing suicide bombings as its main tool to target Israeli military positions in Lebanon. Mounting Israeli casualties in Lebanon led the Israeli Government of Prime Minister Ehud Barak to unilaterally withdraw Israeli forces on May 24, 2000.

Lesson: An asymmetrical warfare environment is much more effective that standing armies in defeating the might of Israel’s armed forces.

3. Israel Security: At Risk
The rise of Hamas in the Palestinian occupied territories and the growing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon has fundamentally transformed Israel’s immediate neighborhood. Israel’s “borders” became much more vulnerable with an increasingly volatile and insecure environment.

Further compounding the fragility of Israel Security was the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, which brought to an end the U.S. containment strategy. That sudden turn of events transformed Israel Security in the eyes of many U.S. policymakers from a strategic asset to a moral commitment.

The Lost Decade of the 90’s (as I referred to it in Part II of this series) was in reality a double-missed opportunity for the United States: failure to capitalize on Rafsanjani’s Presidency in Iran to boost its Oil Security Pillar, and, as we saw in this part, failure to reshape the environment affecting its Israel Security Pillar. In summary, the wasted 90’s was actually the root cause for instability shaking both pillars of the U.S. Mideast strategy.

It is imperative to keep this background in mind as we explore the post 9/11 regional developments in Part IV of this series, subtitled “An Emerging New Order.” Developments include America’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of Iran and Turkey as the new regional powers eclipsing Egypt and Saudi Arabia in influencing Muslim opinion and power, the entrance of China as a key international player in the region and its impact on the “Competitive Power Game” between the U.S. and China vis-à-vis oil and gas, and the options available for U.S. policymakers in affecting this new order.

Cultural Intelligence matters!

On July 18, British naval forces intercepted the ship and boarded it in international waters off the coast of Palestine. A clash ensued with the immigrants on board resulting in three deaths with more than 30 wounded. Britain faced worldwide condemnation for having used excessive force in dealing with the ship’s passengers.

The ship’s name was Exodus 1947, and it became the symbol of Jewish Aliya Bet. The international outrage forced the British to change their policy and in September 1947, the United Nations voted to partition Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. With the departure of the last contingent of British forces from Palestine on May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the State of Israel.

On May 30, 2010, more than 500 Palestinian activists and sympathizers sailed from Turkey aboard the Mavi Marmara ship as part of the “Free Gaza Flotilla” in an effort to “break the siege imposed by Israel on Gaza.”

On May 31, the Israeli Navy intercepted the ship, which was then boarded by Israeli commandoes. The clash that ensued resulted in the death of more than a dozen activists and approximately thirty wounded. Israel is facing worldwide condemnation for having used excessive force, and Palestinians and their supporters are vowing to continue the flotilla effort until the Gaza siege is lifted.

Will the Mavi Marmara end up having the same historical significance to Palestinians as did the Exodus 1947 for Jews? Only time will tell.

Cultural intelligence matters.

The luncheon keynote speaker on Friday, October 23rd was Professor Bernard Lewis. His talk, entitled “The Iranian Difference,” focused on the centrality of Iran and its Islamic revolution to the future of the Middle East region, the Islamic world and the conflict with the West.

Iran’s Exceptionalism
Prof. Lewis articulated very clearly how Iran stands out in contrast with Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa region as follows:
- Iran is a true nation that is rich in ethnic diversity and enjoys a strong common national identity with a high degree of patriotism among its people.
- Iran is the only country to have succeeded in preserving its own Persian language, despite its adoption of an Arabic derived script and the infusion of Arabic words. In all other countries in that region, the Arab Moslem expansion out of Arabia decimated all local languages (the Berber and Kurdish languages are notable exceptions, though spoken by people not countries).
- Iran made very important contributions to human civilization in science, engineering (water and wind mills), communication (invented the first courier relay system), games (chess and backgammon), and food delights (sugar and candy).
- Most importantly, according to Prof. Lewis, Iran introduces a different understanding of fatalism in Islamic culture. Its concept is similar to the game of backgammon where the dice represent the fatalism of destiny but the player’s skills determine whether one wins or loses!!

The Iranian Revolution
Prof. Lewis explained how the word revolution was abused by regimes in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in attempts to give legitimacy to what in reality amounted to coups or putsches. By contrast, the Iranian Revolution was a true phenomenon similar to the French and Russian Revolutions. While the French and Russian Revolutions transformed in radical ways the world of Christendom, so would the Iranian Revolution radically transform the world of Islam. As revolutions do go through phases, Prof. Lewis posed the question: Would the Iranian Revolution turn Napoleonic or Stalinist?

A Stalinist Revolution
Prof. Lewis expressed his conviction that the Iranian Revolution is Stalinist in nature and has, therefore, identified its struggle with its enemies in apocalyptic and messianic terms. According to him, the Iranian Revolution will go through three phases of struggle:
- Phase I: defeating its internal enemy – Sunni Islam – in order to impose Shiite hegemony. Prof. Lewis described Shiite ascendancy in the Gulf region, especially Iraq.
- Phase II: conquering its regional enemy, Israel, the only country capable of stopping Iran’s regional expansionist designs.
- Phase III: the apocalyptic phase consisting of the final struggle against the infidels – i.e. the West. According to Prof. Lewis, the United States should have no illusions about Iran and its designs against the West. He affirmed that Iran intends on having nuclear weapons in order to fulfill its apocalyptic prophecy. He also argued that while the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) doctrine did work as a deterrent in the case of Communism and the Soviet Union, it would be seen as an inducement and not a deterrent in the case of Iran and Islam. He reminded the audience of Ayatollah Khomeini’s book on the Islamic Revolution, stating that some had referred to that book as Khomeini’s Mein Kampf.

Options for the West
Prof. Lewis articulated the difficulty and fragility of the current situation. While there are openings and opportunities within Iran, either within the regime or from without that are opposed to the regime, he believes the current regime is so oppressive and repressive that any possible change will take a long time. He also cautioned against rushing towards a military solution to the nuclear dilemma because of complex regional security issues and the destructive capability of weapons at hand. He closed his speech, however, with the note that, in the end, a military solution may well indeed be the only feasible one.

Unanswered Questions
The core argument presented by Prof. Lewis rests on his assertion that the Iranian Revolution has global designs aimed at the destruction of the infidels – a clash of civilizations of sort.

The validity of such an assertion depends on passing a key test: How can Prof. Lewis reconcile his vision of the Iranian Revolution with the following facts:

September 11th
Iran was one of the first countries to condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11th. More significantly, Iran was the only Moslem country wherein candle light vigils in solidarity with the victims of September 11th took place on September 18th in a number of cities, including Teheran. No other Moslem country had that.

War on the Taliban
Following the Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and until the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom by the United States on October 7, 2001, Iran was the main country supporting a coalition of forces (Northern Alliance) fighting the Islamist extremist movement of the Taliban and their allies – Al Qaeda!

Upon the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. led forces, the Iranian government, while officially declaring its opposition to the invasion, in practice provided indirect support to the entire effort. In its report entitled Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of military and Intelligence Support – CRS Report: October 17, 2001, the Congressional Research Service stated:
“When the United States took the decision to invade Afghanistan in 2001, Iran remains a staunch opponent of the Taliban and has been providing weapons to the Northern Alliance. It has also closed its border with Afghanistan. In response to a request from the Bush Administration, Iran has agreed to rescue any American military personnel in distress in its territory.”

Following the toppling of the Taliban government in Afghanistan by U.S. led forces in 2001, American and Iranian diplomats met in Bonn, Germany, to develop a new constitution and establish a new government for Afghanistan. “None was more [helpful] than the Iranians,” said James Dobbins, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan at the time, writing in the Washington Post. “The original version of the Bonn agreement … neglected to mention either democracy or the war on terrorism. It was the Iranian representative who spotted these omissions and successfully urged that the newly emerging Afghan government be required to commit to both.”

Lionel Beehner of the Council on Foreign relations wrote on March 9, 2007, that “Iran also cooperated with the United Nations to repatriate nearly one million Afghan refugees residing on its soil and—working with United States, Russia, and India—provided support to the Northern Alliance.” Flynt Leverett of the Brookings Institution tells CFR.org’s Bernard Gwertzman, “I think at least some Iranian officials were hoping could get leveraged into a broader strategic dialogue, but that channel was effectively foreclosed when President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address labeled Iran as part of the ‘Axis of Evil.’”

Dialogue Among Civilizations
It was Ayatollah Khatami, the President of Iran, who introduced in 2001 the theory known as Dialogue Among Civilizations to counter Samuel Huntington’s theory of Clash of Civilizations. His theory won worldwide approval as the United Nations adopted a resolution naming the year 2001 as the year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. Khatami published his book in Persian entitled Dialogue Among Civilizations in which he strongly advocated the need for civilizations to dialogue for the purpose of building a more peaceful and prosperous world.

Invasion of Iraq
While the government of Iran had officially condemned the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States and its allies, in reality, it facilitated U.S operations. In preparation for the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, U.S. government officials reached a secret agreement with Iraqi Shiite leaders. This enabled U.S. led forces to invade Iraq from the Shiite dominated south with minimal resistance. A key Shiite figure was Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, who headed the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the main Shiite opposition group to the regime of Saddam Hussein. The group had, until the invasion of Iraq in 2003, been based in Iran and received much of its funding from Iran for almost 20 years.

The Iranian government led by reformer Ayatollah Khatami knocked repeatedly on the doors of Washington and sent strong signals aimed at starting a dialogue with the United States for the ultimate purpose of normalizing relations. For many reasons too long to list in this piece, the Bush Administration turned a deaf ear and countered with a policy of “regime change” in Iran. For more information on the missed opportunities by the United States in its dealings with Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979, please refer to the Security Debrief blog that I authored on May 29, 2009, entitled “Iran: the U.S. Needs a New Strategy.”

Jews and Christians in the Islamic Republic of Iran
There is no argument over the fact that the Islamist government of Iran imposes many restrictions on Jews and Christians living in that country, displays hostility toward them at times, and uses repressive means to combat conversions from Islam to other religions. This discriminatory and at times oppressive atmosphere within which Jews and Christians have to live with on a daily basis does not, however, justify the claim made by Prof. Lewis that the Iranian regime is bent on a war against the infidels.

No one knows the exact number of Christians currently present in Iran, but estimates vary between 200,000 to 300,000 Christians with a majority being Armenians. In 2008, the Iranian government increased from $70,000 to $300,000 its budget to assist in the restoration of Saint Stephanos Church in Jolfa, Iran, an 11th century Armenian church of great historical and religious significance to the Christian Armenian community worldwide. Furthermore, one of Iran’s closest allies is the Republic of Armenia, a country that claims to have been the first Christian Kingdom in the world.

The largest Jewish population in the entire Middle East outside of Israel is still today in Iran. On February 23, 2009, New York Times Op-Ed Columnist Roger Cohen published a column from the Iranian city of Esfahan in which he stated: “…Still a mystery hovers over Iran’s Jews. It’s important to decide what’s more significant: the annihilationist anti-Israel ranting, the Holocaust denial and other Iranian provocations — or the fact of a Jewish community living, working and worshiping in relative tranquility. Perhaps I have a bias toward facts over words, but I say the reality of Iranian civility toward Jews tells us more about Iran — its sophistication and culture — than all the inflammatory rhetoric. That may be because I’m a Jew and have seldom been treated with such consistent warmth as in Iran. Or perhaps I was impressed that the fury over Gaza, trumpeted on posters and Iranian TV, never spilled over into insults or violence toward Jews. Or perhaps it’s because I’m convinced the ‘Mad Mullah’ caricature of Iran and likening of any compromise with it to Munich 1938 — a position popular in some American Jewish circles — is misleading and dangerous.”

The Iranian Difference
While Prof. Lewis makes several valid points and presents a strong argument in support of his theory, facts on the ground and actions by Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 present a different reality.

Maybe Prof. Lewis needs to address another fundamental question regarding Iran. The West is currently engaged in a struggle against a Wahhabi/Salafi inspired transnational movement that:
- Was responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11th as well as numerous other terrorist attacks throughout the world, including India, Spain, the United Kingdom, Israel, Turkey, Morocco, etc.
- Is waging war on Afghanistan and Pakistan, threatening the security of that entire region
- Is spreading its influence throughout the Sunni Moslem world in Africa, India, Europe, North and South America, etc.
- Is actively advocating a war against the Infidels, to use the word of Prof. Lewis

Could Iran, if approached by the West through a different prism, possibly make the difference in this worldwide struggle?

•    Khomeini became the supreme leader until his death in 1989.  He advocated for a velayat e faqih with near absolute powers given to the supreme leader.
•    Motahhari’s influence, which was significant in the years preparing for the revolution, came to an abrupt end with his assassination on May 1, 1979, before he could influence the debate over the direction of the Islamic government.
•    Beheshti (assassinated in 1981) was close to Rafsanjani and influenced the thinking of Mohammad Khatami.  He had his doubts about the powers entrusted to the supreme leader.
•    Khameini was closest to Khomeini and succeeded the latter as supreme leader in 1989. He is opposed to reforming the current system but lacks his predecessor’s charisma and stature.
•    Mousavi Ardebili, who did some of his studies in Najaf, Iraq under the guidance of Ayatollahs Khoi (Khu’ee), Hakim and Shirazi, is currently the senior theologian of the Islamic republic.  He was the head of the judiciary until 1989 and founded Mofid University.  He has mixed views regarding the powers of the supreme leader.  (It is important to note that the Hawza of Najaf has historically consistently opposed the velayat e faqih system of government.)
•    Mahdavi Kani became an influential member of the Guardians Council and showed his more liberal political views when he declared the foreign trade nationalization bills and land reform bills in the 80’s to be against the teachings of Islam.  He too has mixed feelings about the powers of the supreme leader.
•    Taleghani was probably the most influential leader of the Islamic revolution.  He paved the way for Khomeini and was the chairman of the Revolutionary Council plotting for the revolution.  Upon the return of Khomeini to Iran, he became the most vocal opponent to the absolutist powers of the supreme leader and often ‘clashed’ with Khomeini on this issue leading to a major rift between them in April 1979.  His sudden death in September 1979 robbed the reformers of a powerful figure.
•    Rafsanjani along with Khameini were the closest Ayatollahs to Khomeni and held the most power.  He was instrumental in the founding of the most important institutions of power of the newly established theocracy, became Speaker of the Parliament and was elected twice to the Presidency.  Under his leadership, fundamental economic reforms were undertaken liberalizing Iran’s economy and major moves towards normalizing relations with the West were also initiated.  He opposes the absolutist powers of the supreme leader.

Of the seven original most influential Ayatollahs around Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, five (Beheshti, Mousavi Ardebili, Mahdavi Kani, Talleghani and Rafsanjani) while being strong supporters of the establishment of an Islamic Republic were opposed in varying degrees to the powers of the Supreme Leader (which include the power to remove an elected President from office) as advanced by Khomeini.

Iranian intellectuals and much of the middle class had a different vision and outlook in mind for the post-Shah Iran.  Most were contemplating the establishment of a secular constitutional republic and some had envisioned a more Marxist type of government.  In the end, however, Khomeini was so popular that the country overwhelmingly supported his call for establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran with an Islamic Constitution in an open referendum held in April 1979.

Given the divisions among the clerics vis-à-vis the powers of the supreme leader, it was a matter of time before these differences would come to the surface.  The major ‘crack’ in the system appeared following the election on January 25, 1980, of Abolhassan Banisadr as the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Banisadr, who was not a cleric, clashed with the clergy over his powers as President.  This had the potential of creating a rift within the country, a rift that could have been used by the reformers; but something else happened.

First Setback for Reformers
The one most important event that stopped the reform movement from gaining ground and more openly challenging the velayat e faqih system of government took place on September 22, 1980, when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran.   Khomeini seized the invasion as an opportunity in the name of national security to get rid of Banisadr and his government and to consolidate his own power.  On June 10, 1981, Khomeini removed Banisadr as Commander-in-Chief and assigned the office to himself.  Eleven days later, Banisadr was impeached by Parliament and the order was signed by Khomeini the following day.  The war had a devastating effect on Iran.  Iranians suffered more than 300,000 casualties and were subjected to Iraqi mustard gas attacks.  The eight-year war came to an end when a ceasefire was reached on August 20, 1988.  Iranian national pride and the need for unity in facing Iraq’s assault muted the reformers’ voices and effectively barred them from openly challenging the system.  On the other hand, Khomeini and his conservative allies seized this opportunity to consolidate their hold on power.

Pendulum Swing
The two most powerful Ayatollahs in Iran were still Ali Khameini and Akbar Rafsanjani.  Khomeini appointed Ali Khameini to succeed him as supreme leader upon his death in 1989.  This presented an opening to Rafsanjani and his followers.  With Khameini lacking the charisma and popular stature that Khomeini enjoyed, Rafsanjani worked diligently to position himself as the other “pole” of power in the Islamic Republic.  He took the lead in pushing political and economic reforms, giving Parliament and the Presidency a greater role in governance, in an attempt to position those offices as counterweights to the office of the supreme leader.  The 90’s was an important period led primarily by Rafsanjani with the pendulum starting to swing in a direction away from the supreme leader.  This was a critical juncture for the reformers.  They had drawn an important lesson from the Iran-Iraq war.  As long as Iran was besieged by the outside world with sanctions, embargoes, and calls for regime change, Iranian domestic reforms could not go far for two major reasons:

a) Foreign investment in Iran’s infrastructure and industrial base, including oil and gas, were desperately needed to help them move the country forward.  In the absence of normalized relations with the United States that would not be possible.
b) The push by the reformers for change in the regime’s power structure while the country is under international siege will most definitely be labeled by Khameini and his conservative allies as undermining the national security of the country.  Conservatives would then exploit Iranian pride and nationalism to undermine their reform efforts.

With that in mind, as soon as Rafsanjani assumed the Presidency in 1989, he seriously explored ways to start a dialogue with the United States aimed at normalizing relations between both countries.  The United States, however, was pre-occupied with an increasingly belligerent and aggressive Iraq threatening its small and powerless neighbor Kuwait and testing US security commitments in the region.  The George Herbert Walker Bush Administration decided this wasn’t the time for discussing normalization of relations with Iran.  Saddam invades Kuwait on August 2, 1990.  The United States with the full support of the United Nations and key Arab states led a multinational force and launched Operation Desert Storm aimed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.  The war was successfully executed and on February 26, 1991, Kuwait was liberated.  Iran remained isolated.

Iranian reformers had then hoped that President George H.W. Bush, when and if re-elected, would be ready and willing to engage in normalization talks.  In their calculus, given Iraq’s war waging against its neighbors and the need for long term security and stability in the Gulf region, the United States would be willing to see a potential positive role to be played by Iran in this equation.  Furthermore, Iranian reformers were very aware of the political and cultural pressures the Saudi government would be subjected to by Wahhabis and Salafis due to the heavy presence of American troops on Saudi soil and in the region.  Hopes were pinned by Iranian reformers on Bush’s re-election, but William Jefferson Clinton was elected President in 1992.

Second Setback for Reformers
The election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States was seen as a setback by Iranian reformers.  In their eyes, President H.W. Bush was a realist and pragmatist who put the US national interest above special interest such as that of Israel supporters in Washington.  The Clinton Administration, on the other hand, made Israeli security a primary objective and pursued a two-prong policy to achieve it.

Firstly, the Clinton Administration believed that peace with the Palestinians would better serve Israel’s long term security.  Efforts were exerted to promote an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord through direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO.  The Oslo Agreement of 1993 was signed and the Clinton Administration invested a lot of time and energy in managing the conflict between both parties and trying to bring them closer to one another through intense sets of negotiations.

Secondly, in the eyes of the Clinton Administration, the security of Israel also required a) containment of Iranian influence rather than an accommodation of Iranian concerns; and b) containment of Iraq’s rising influence and belligerence within the Arab world in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War (war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation during which Iraq fired Scud missiles on Israel).  In order to achieve this security objective, the Clinton Administration announced its dual containment strategy.

With the priorities of the Clinton Administration set as described above, attempts in the 90’s by Rafsanjani to open up to the United States went nowhere because they ran counter to the Clinton Administration’s strategy of dual containment and its regional security policy framework.  This represented the second major setback to the reformers in Iran.

Opportunity Knocking
The terrorist attacks of September 11th against the United States sent political shockwaves through the US security and foreign policy establishments.  With Al Qaeda and Sunni Wahhabi/Salafi inspired Islamism striking at the United States, the Iranian reform establishment saw an opportunity for a possible rapprochement with Washington that could ultimately lead to normalized relations.  In their thinking, as explained earlier, improved relations with the US were necessary to help them push system reforms more successfully.  Under the leadership of Ayatollah and President Mohammad Khatami, a leader among the reformers and a close ally of Rafsanjani, Iran seized on the attacks of 9/11 and took the following steps all aimed at sending positive signals to Washington:

•    Condemnation of Al Qaeda: Iran was the first Moslem country to condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  Furthermore, the only candlelight vigils to take place in a Moslem country expressing solidarity with the victims of 9/11 were held in Iran on September 18, 2001.
•    Cooperation on Afghanistan: Iran played a very constructive role in assisting the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 aimed at removing the Taliban from power.  It also played a pivotal role in supporting the establishment of a new democratically oriented government in Afghanistan.
•    “Facilitating” the Invasion of Iraq: The United States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, launching Operation Iraqi Freedom aimed at the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a pro-American and more democratically oriented government in Baghdad.   The invasion came from the south with US forces traveling northward towards Baghdad.  There was practically no resistance from Shiite Iraqis who constitute the majority of the population in southern Iraq.  “Understandings” had been reached prior to the invasion between US officials and exiled Iraqi Shiite religious leaders such as Khoi (Khu’ee) and Hakim, two of the three most prominent Iraqi Ayatollahs  at the time (the most influential being Grand Ayatollah Sistani).
•    Nuclear Program Freeze: Iran froze its nuclear program in yet another goodwill gesture towards Washington and Khatami sent a message to the George W. Bush Administration expressing Iran’s desire to have talks aimed at normalizing relations between both countries.

Divisions within the Bush Administration regarding US policy towards Iran paralyzed American response and by 2004, “hawks” within the Administration were advocating regime change in Iran.  The opportunity that the reformers had sought in the aftermath of 9/11 was missed.  Furthermore, conservatives in Iran capitalized on the US’s negative response to overtures by Iranian reformers likening it to a “kick in the butt” and presenting it to the Iranian public as unambiguous proof that Washington’s real objective was the destruction of the Iranian nation.  Given this national security perception, past negative experiences with the United States (refer to a Security Debrief on Iran published on May 29, 2009), the deteriorating security situation in Iraq with potential spillover effect into Iran, and the failure of the reformers over 15 years to produce substantial changes to the system, Ayatollah Khameini and conservative mullahs were able to “facilitate” the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran in August 2005.

Countering Regime Change
The Iranian government led by Ahmadinejad became very aggressive and quite belligerent in response to what they perceived as Washington’s aim of regime change in Iran.  From 2005 through 2008, conservatives rallied behind Ahmadinejad and exploited to the fullest advantage the policies of the Bush Administration’s second term (see Security Debrief on Iran published of May 29, 2009);  capitalizing on Iranian pride and sense of nationalism.  During this period of heightened US-Iranian tensions, the region became quite unstable with violence reaching new heights.

•    Religious strife between Sunnis and Shiites erupted in Iraq in 2006 threatening the Bush Administration’s stated goals in that country.
•    A 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah was fought in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 causing numerous civilian casualties and leaving in its aftermath Hezbollah in a much stronger position.  Arab popular opinion rallied behind Hezbollah posing a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
•    A war between Israel and Hamas was fought in Gaza in November 2008 that ended with Hamas retaining power in Gaza and winning greater sympathy from Arabs and Moslems worldwide.  The war also put President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority between “a rock and a hard place” and threatened his credibility among Palestinians.
•    Iranian calls for the destruction of Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric became quite intense.
•    Iran resumed its nuclear program much more aggressively in defiance of the United States and the international community.

During those very tense years, the reformers in Iran could not be seen as challenging their own system of government for fear of being undermined by the conservatives as ‘puppets’ of America.  The conservatives were very successful in painting a very bleak picture to the Iranian public wherein Iran’s existence was being actively threatened by the United States and Israel.  Given this environment, reformers in Iran got busy regrouping their forces quietly awaiting their “next opportunity”.

New Opportunity Knocking
The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States provided the reformers in Iran with another golden opportunity.  His rhetoric during the campaign, and more importantly, his actions since assuming the Presidency all pointed to his willingness to establish a dialogue with Iran.  His message to the Iranian government and people on March 19, 2009, on the occasion of the Persian New Year (Nowruz or Norouz) went a long way to point to Iranians that the United States was willing and ready to open a new chapter in US-Iranian relations based on mutual respect and dialogue.  Furthermore, President Obama delivered an address to the Moslem World in Cairo, Egypt on June 4, 2009, which was a resounding success from a public diplomacy perspective.  When the Obama Administration decided to engage Iran after and not before the June Presidential elections, a major race erupted between the reformers and conservatives in Iran.  Who would be in power to negotiate with the United States?

To the reformers, winning the Presidential elections would enable them to quickly engage the United States and normalize relations more expeditiously.  This would then give them the needed boost to pursue the reforms of the system of government and the role of the supreme leader in the Islamic Republic.  To the conservatives, Ahmadinejad’s retention of the Presidency would enable them to negotiate with the United States from a position of strength and help them contain and/or manage internal reforms more effectively.  All surveys and public opinion polls conducted about two weeks prior to the election were showing Ahmadinejad winning by a comfortable margin.  Reformers, on the other hand, made a major last minute push using modern technology and electronic social networks to rally support and enthuse the younger generation to participate in greater numbers in the election.  While no one can, at this point, assert with full knowledge who really won the election, one can safely state that the authorities working under Ahmadinejad did manipulate the election results (at least in Teheran) where the margin of victory (whether for Ahmadinejad or Mousavi) should have been very small.

What happened next?  Conservatives underestimated the resolve of the reformers and their determination to score a Presidential victory.  The reformers, having suffered repeated setbacks in the past, were determined this time around to go all the way pitting all their hopes on the persona of Barack Obama; who appears to them as more genuine and serious about a frank and open dialogue with Iran. They chose to defy the results as announced by the government and Mir Mousavi called for street protests and demonstrations.  Ahmadinejad and his conservative allies pressed Khameini to side with them in order to put an end to the protests.  Khameini, after much hesitation, came down on the side of Ahmadinejad with the hope that his stature would be sufficient to bring an end to the “chaos” and did so with the full realization that he might jeopardize the “Office of the Supreme Leader” by having it painted as “partisan” when it is supposed to be above all politics.  With Khameini taking sides with Ahmadinejad, the reformers decided to openly and publically challenge the legitimacy of the system and the power of the supreme leader.

“Those responsible for organizing the elections have obligations to the people. Unfortunately, events that have taken place after the election have caused turmoil in the Islamic Republic. We should not use force to pacify the protests. The issue must be resolved in a different manner,” stated Ayatollah Ardebili on June 27, 2009.

On July 17, 2009, Ayatollah and former President Rafsanjani spoke at Teheran University on the occasion of Friday mosque prayers and heavily criticized the government’s actions.  “Today is a bitter day,” he said at Tehran University. “People have lost their faith in the regime and their trust is damaged. It’s necessary that we regain people’s consent and their trust in the regime.”

This prompted a reply on Saturday, July 18, 2009, by conservative Ayatollah Yazdi:  “Legitimacy and acceptance are different in Islamic government,” Ayatollah Yazdi told the semi-official Fars news agency. “Votes alone do not create legitimacy.”

On Sunday, July 19, 2009, Ayatollah and former President Khatami called for a referendum on the legitimacy of the Iranian government stating that millions of Iranians had lost faith in the electoral system.

The lines have been drawn.  The real dispute is among the Ayatollahs over the power of the Supreme Leader and the velayat e faqih system of Islamic government with Rafsanjani and Khatami leading the charge.  Furthermore, the “weakening” of Khameini’s stature as Supreme Leader may boost among the clerics in Iran the influence of Grand Ayatollah Sistani (Najaf, Iraq) who had consistently opposed the velayat e faqih system of government.

Constitutional Reforms
The objective of the reformers at this stage is to keep pushing as far as they can with the final aim of ridding the system of the velyat e faqih and replace it with an Islamic system governed by three branches – Parliament, Presidency and Judiciary – wherein the Supreme Leader is stripped of his political powers and acts only as the spiritual leader of the faith.  This change would conform to the teachings and jurisprudence of Shiite traditions as advocated by the Hawza of NajafIraq and would radically transform the nature and operations of the Iranian government.  In reality, this has been the “secret” aim of the reformers among the Ayatollahs, especially Rafsanjani and Khatami.  They both experienced the Presidency and tried to steer the country down a progressive path to find the Supreme Leader blocking them at every turn.  They became fed up with the system and sought ways to change it but acted with a lot of prudence.   This explains why in the early days of the protests, they did not challenge the system directly (they let Mir Mousavi, a non-cleric, do so) and waited for the right moment.  The opportune moment came when Ayatotallah Khameini took sides favoring Ahmadinejad.  He was no longer “above politics” or “untouchable” as supreme leader.  Rafsanjani and Khatami decided then to openly challenge the system and the authority of the Supreme Leader.

What Should the United States Do?
Firstly, President Obama must be commended for exhibiting prudence and wisdom in his measured response to the developments in Iran since the June elections.   Many in Washington have been advocating a tougher stance by the United States to show solidarity with the demonstrators.  Some have even advocated to have the United States seize this moment to strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities or allow Israel to do it.  President Obama has wisely resisted these pressures because the stakes are very high for the United States and a “wrong” move at this juncture could, in time,  do irreversible damage to American national security interests.  Let me explain.

Non-Interference
The reformers in Iran do not want the United States, and definitely not Israel, to appear as directly interfering in this crisis.  As long as the US remains out of it, the reformers have greater chances for success.  As I explained earlier, conservatives in Iran have always exploited US calls for regime change, containment and tougher sanctions to undermine any serious effort for reform through open debate in the name of national security (i.e., this is not the time to show divisions when confronted by US anti-Iranian aggressive measures).  The reformers want the United States to stay out of this crisis and are betting on President Obama to help them carry the day by not interfering.  The conservatives cannot use President Obama as an excuse given his speeches and moves regarding US-Iranian relations.

Engage?
Should the Obama Administration engage Iran at this stage? How? When and under what circumstances?  These are very critical questions that demand serious answers especially in light of the September 28th deadline given to Iran on the nuclear issue (prior to the next G-20 meeting).  The inclination by many in Washington is to have the United States push for tougher sanctions through the UN Security Council if Iran fails to meet the nuclear conditions by that deadline.  That is exactly what the conservatives in Iran are hoping for, given the current crisis they’re facing domestically, and that is exactly what the United States should avoid doing.  The United States has too much to lose this time around if the Obama Administration falls into the same old cycle of “speaking tough” and advocating sanctions.  What is the alternative?  Before answering the questions above, it is important to analyze further the dynamics of the current situation on the ground in Iran.

The reformers having by now put everything on the line are trying to form a more solid coalition made up of them (clerics), prominent civilians, respected revolutionary leaders, representatives of the middle class, intellectuals, and students (18-25 years old).  This coalition is not yet in place and lacks a clear vision.  No one can predict whether, when and how this effort may succeed because the situation is very fluid and must be monitored on an hourly – not even daily – basis.  What is certain, however, is that the system has suffered irreparable damage to its credibility and legitimacy.  The reformers hope to force a referendum on the legitimacy of the current government which they foresee winning.  The conservatives, on the other hand, have already recognized that damage was done and are desperately trying to contain it.  I say contain it, because the conservatives are very weary of using deadly force against the reformers; they know that the rank and file of the Revolutionary Guards are divided over the current state of affairs in the country and may risk division or possibly rebellion within the Guards if they were to order them to use deadly force.    In summary, there is an internal dynamic in Iran that is very fluid and may produce mutations in different directions.

Secret Diplomacy
Given the uncertainty of the direction that events may take on the ground in Iran, the one most important fact for the United States is that it faces now an Iran that has a weaker government in place being challenged by a growing opposition.  The United States should seize this opportunity to engage in “secret” diplomacy.  Silence is gold in such circumstances.  Messages should be conveyed to both sides that the United States remains committed to engaging Iran on the basis of respect and mutual interests (refer to Security debrief on Iran dated May 29, 2009) and would like to do so as soon as possible.  This move by the United States would be welcomed by the reformers because it would limit the current government’s maneuverability against them.  It would also be welcomed by Ahmadinejad and Khameini (not all the conservatives) who would use it to contain the reformers’ final push at this time.

The United States has everything to gain and almost nothing to lose in engaging NOW in secret diplomacy with both sides.  Some may argue that, given these divisions within Iran, the United States would be better off having the situation in Iran deteriorate on the security level even to the point of civil war.  This would make it easier for the US military to take out the nuclear facilities with Iranians busy fighting among themselves.  At a first glance, this option may appear appealing as serving to fulfill the objective relating to Iran’s nuclear program.  It will, however, make Iran an unstable country with unpredictable and possibly devastating consequences to American national security interests in the Gulf region.  In other words, a stable Iran with better relations with Washington serves best the national security interest of the United States; an unstable Iran would most definitely be exploited by radical Islamists to spread chaos in the region and would present a clear and present danger to the United States.

Cultural intelligence matters!

Almost everyone involved in national security affairs, within and outside the government, talks about the threat that Iran poses to U.S. interests in the Middle East as follows:

-    Iran was responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States in 1983 in Lebanon
-    Iran sponsors terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza-    Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability that threatens regional stability
-    Iran has been actively engaged in trying to defeat U.S. efforts in Iraq-    Iran threatens Israel’s security and existence through its vitriolic anti-Semitic rhetoric and support of Hamas

Given this view of the Iranian threat and Iranian’s unabated belligerent behavior, national security policymakers and opinion makers in the United States almost unanimously agree that the past policies of sanction regimes and containment employed by successive U.S. Administrations since 1979 have failed to produce the change in Iranian policies and attitudes towards the United States and the region.  Furthermore, almost all agree that the perceived Iranian threat has increased in scope and magnitude and therefore requires an American approach that is drastically different.  We find the national security community in Washington generally divided into two groups: those advocating a much tougher stance on Iran that includes the use of preemptive military force to destroy Iranian nuclear and military strategic capabilities; and those advocating an engagement approach to discuss ways to neutralize Iran’s nuclear threat while building an Arab regional axis to counter Iranian influence in the region.

-    Iran has been actively engaged in trying to defeat U.S. efforts in Iraq

Unfortunately, both approaches are derived from the same old prism and may have catastrophic consequences for the region’s stability, oil security, and U.S. long term interests.   Let me explain.

Approach I: Military Operation
A U.S. military operation against Iran may be very successful in destroying most if not all of Iran’s nuclear program’s facilities and capabilities.  The real question, however, does not center on America’s military capability to defeat Iran, but rather on what happens in the aftermath of a military victory.  Based on “cultural intelligence understanding” of the region, here are possible outcomes resulting from a U.S. military campaign against Iran:
-    Unstable Iran:  the destruction of Iran’s organized military infrastructure may bring about non-centralized armed militias that could operate with impunity and pose a very serious danger to neighboring countries.  There is one very important lesson to draw from the 2003 Iraq war — in the absence of an organized national army, armed militias and terrorist cells will most certainly emerge posing a more serious threat due to the asymmetrical world in which they operate.
-    Unstable Gulf: an unstable Iran will most definitely affect stability in neighboring Gulf countries which have large Shiite deprived populations and lack the capability to fight asymmetrical wars against extremist militias and/or organizations.  We also need to take into account the possibility of Iranian retaliation against oil and other strategic facilities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf during and following a U.S. military campaign.
-    Unstable Iraq: all gains made in recent months in Iraq could be greatly reversed endangering the safety of the more than 120,000 U.S. troops still deployed in that country.  In a best case scenario, the Shiite community will split on whether to side with Iran, and in a worst case scenario, Shiites will unite against the United States.  Sunni extremists and Al-Qaeda will seize the opportunity to regroup and may even join forces with extremist Shiites in the fight against the United States posing a greater danger to the safety of U.S. troops who are currently operating under a withdrawal scenario and are not gearing up for major operations.
-    Israel’s Security: the Middle East of 2009 is drastically different from what it was in 1967 and poses a much greater threat to Israel’s security.  In 1967, Israel defeated the armies of several Arab countries combined, waged war on Arab territory, and had friendly regimes in power in Iran and Turkey.  Today, Israel faces a transformed Middle East.

Lebanon:  in the summer of 2006, Hezbollah dealt Israel a military defeat, admittedly limited and relative.  Furthermore, there is a strong probability that the opposition, which is led by Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (headed by Christian General Michel Aoun), may score a victory in the parliamentary elections of June 6, 2009.  In a best case scenario for the United States and Israel, the opposition as a block will not get a majority, but Hezbollah will most certainly be part of the government and a force to be reckoned with; and in a worst case scenario for the United States and Israel, the opposition may win a majority in Parliament further enhancing Hezbollah’s power position within the Lebanese government.
Gaza:  Hamas controls the Gaza strip and is launching rockets targeting Israeli towns.  If open and democratic elections were to take place in the West Bank today, Hamas along with other more radical Islamist groups would probably win.
Arab Countries:  Arab Sunni Islamists have made the liberation of Palestine a sacred struggle and Arab undemocratic regimes are besieged by Sunni extremist Islamism advocating total war on Israel using the Hezbollah and Hamas models.  Israel’s wars in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008 have emboldened Sunni Islamists throughout the region.
Iran:  the current Iranian regime poses a serious threat to Israel’s security and existence and is supporting militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.
Iraq: the country is governed today by a Shiite majority that is closer to Iran.
Turkey:  the current democratically elected government of Turkey is more Islamist (though not extremist) and has drawn closer to Iran and Syria than in the past.
Israel:  Israeli Arabs have become much more outspoken about the conflict with the Palestinians and had a “mini uprising” against the Israeli government during the Gaza war in 2008.
Given this state of affairs in the Middle East today, if the United States (or Israel) were to launch a military campaign against Iran, it could create a much more explosive situation with unpredictable consequences for Israel.

The Iranian Threat Viewed through the Old Prism
Almost everyone involved in national security affairs, within and outside the government, talks about the threat that Iran poses to U.S. interests in the Middle East as follows:
-    Iran was responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States in 1983 in Lebanon
-    Iran sponsors terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza
-    Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability that threatens regional stability

Approach II: Diplomatic Engagement
Those in Washington who see the potential danger in and the explosive chaos resulting from a military operation against Iran, advocate a strong diplomatic engagement aimed at neutralizing its nuclear threat.  To further enhance the U.S. negotiating stance, they also advocate the creation of a de facto coalition of moderate Arab regimes led by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia whose aim would be to curtail Iranian influence in the region.  If the United States were to pursue this approach it would most probably fail in stopping Iran’s nuclear program and further embolden and empower Iran.  Why?  Because this approach is also based on viewing Iran and the Middle East through the old prism and fails to recognize the following:
a)    Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon is a matter of Iranian security; and
b)    In the absence of a final resolution to the Palestinian problem, an anti-Iranian coalition made up of Arab undemocratic and unpopular regimes cannot go far.  Iran will continue to be perceived by Arab populations as the true defender of the Palestinian cause.

Let me explain.

Iranian Security
The Iranian political, religious and national security establishments share (almost unanimously) the view that the United States Government is quite deceitful in its dealings with Iran and, therefore, cannot be trusted.  This is a summary of how Iran perceives itself vis-à-vis U.S. policy:
-    Over the past almost 60 years, the U.S. has always blocked the emergence of democratic governments in the Middle East and continued to prop up absolutist monarchies and dictatorships with the sole aim of exercising greater influence over oil security policies.
-    In the aftermath of the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, the United States has constantly exhibited hostility towards Iran and diligently worked to undermine and/or overthrow the Iranian regime.
-    The Islamic Republic of Iran never invaded or threatened with invasion any of its neighboring countries.  It was aggressed by Iraq in 1980 and suffered a bloody 10-year war in which chemical and other weapons of mass destruction were used against it by Iraq with the tacit, and later more open, support of the U.S. Government.
-    Iran was the first Moslem country in the region to forcefully condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  Furthermore, on September 18, 2001, Iranians held spontaneous candlelight vigils for the victims of the attacks of September 11th.  No Arab country had that.
-    Iran’s constructive cooperation with the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom (launched by the U.S. in 2001 to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban) was repaid by the Bush Administration with tougher anti-Iranian rhetoric.
-    Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, Iran’s “extended hand” of cooperation expressed by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (confirmed by Defense Secretary Gates) and Iran’s goodwill gesture by halting its nuclear program (confirmed by a National Intelligence Estimate at the time) were met with total rejection and regime change rhetoric and policies by the Bush Administration.

Given this view of the United States Government, the Iranian establishment concluded by 2005 that no matter what Iran does (save total submission to destructive U.S. conditions) its security will always be endangered unless it develops its own nuclear capability as a deterrent.  In addition, Iran finds itself in a wider region where Israel, Pakistan, India and China all have nuclear weapons.  In summary, Iran’s quest for a nuclear program has much more to do with security than achieving long term energy independence.   With this background in mind, and in order to counter what they perceived as destructive U.S. policies in the region, the Ayatollahs ‘orchestrated’ presidential elections in 2005 enabling the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s President.  The nuclear program was resumed and a much more aggressive anti-American campaign was adopted by Iran throughout the region.

President Obama’s expressed intentions of wanting to dialogue with Iran has divided (to a certain extent) the Iranian establishment on whether to temporarily freeze their nuclear program in one final attempt at extending a goodwill gesture towards a U.S. President who seems to be more genuine in his intentions and appear to be more understanding but must be tested. This explains to a certain degree the context within which the elections’ debate over the nuclear program is taking place.

Anti-Iranian Coalition
As soon as Iran’s government perceived the Bush Administration to be seriously trying to undermine Iran’s role and position in the region through an anti-Iranian Arab coalition, it adopted a two-tier counter strategy:
-    Defender of the Palestinian Cause:  the victory of Hamas in parliamentary elections in January 2006 generated serious concern among U.S. and Israeli officials because Hamas was committed to an armed struggle against Israel and its charter effectively calls for the destruction of the State of Israel.   The Bush Administration and the Israeli Government embarked almost immediately on a coordinated political and military effort aimed at undermining the power of Hamas.  Facing political isolation in spite of having come to power in democratic and open elections and fearing disruptive actions by Fatah and its security services in the Gaza strip, Hamas took control of Gaza in a preemptive military coup in June 2007.  This is the context within which Iran viewed and interpreted the actions of Hamas in 2007.  The Bush Administration immediately responded by advocating total isolation of Hamas and Gaza and pressured Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to follow suit.

Arab and Moslem populations witnessed, live on satellite television networks such as Al Jazeera, the desperate conditions to which Palestinians in Gaza were subjected to by Israeli and U.S. policies.  They expressed their anger at their own governments for what they perceived as abandonment of the Palestinians in Gaza and the Iranian government saw this as a golden opportunity.   Iran provided support to Hamas, championed the plight of the Palestinian people, criticized the passivity of Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and conducted an aggressive public relations campaign of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rhetoric.   In so doing, Iran positioned itself as the true defender of the Palestinian cause among Arabs and Moslems alike.  The Arab and Moslem perception of Iran as a reliable defender of the Palestinian people was further strengthened during the 2008 war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.  Arabs and Moslems alike repudiated the actions of Arab governments such as Egypt for closing the border with Gaza, trapping thousands of civilians trying to flee the conflict.  In contrast, Iran provided logistical, financial and moral support to Hamas and the Palestinians in Gaza.   By aggressively championing the Palestinian cause, and in the absence of a serious U.S./Israeli effort to resolve the Palestinian problem, Iran was successful in increasing its soft power in the region thus undermining the ability of the Bush Administration to create a viable and solid anti-Iranian Arab coalition.

-    Military Victory: The rhetoric coming out of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia which raised the specter of an Iranian-led Shiite power threatening Arab and Sunni culture and position in the region, was interpreted by the Iranians as part of the U.S. effort to build an anti-Iranian Arab coalition.   To counter this effort and show Sunni Arab Moslems the invalidity of such an argument, Iran engaged in trying to build a Shiite-Sunni coalition in Iraq – united under the banner of nationalism – to fight U.S. occupation of that country.  This Iranian effort proved to have had a very limited effect if any at all.  Another Iranian effort centered on securing an Israeli military defeat.  Nothing rallies Arab and Moslem public opinion like military actions against Israel.  In preparation for such an eventuality, Iran provided Hezbollah in Lebanon with the needed logistics, equipment, financing and training.   The opportunity came knocking on July 12, 2006.  The conflict started when Hezbollah fired rockets on Israeli border towns while simultaneously attacking a couple of Israeli military vehicles.  The attack resulted in the killing of three Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two others by Hezbollah.  Israel responded with an aggressive bombing campaign that escalated into a 33-day war in Lebanon.  Early statements by Arab officials coming out of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia condemned Hezbollah’s actions as “reckless” and endangering the region’s stability.  In Iran’s thinking, Hezbollah had to resist as long as possible and win that war in order to: first, prove to the Arab and Moslem worlds that Israel can be defeated when and if the appropriate strategies are employed against it; and, secondly, to embarrass the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia by portraying them as more eager to appease (if not be in league with) the Israeli enemy instead of standing firm by the side of the Lebanese people who are facing Israeli aggression.  Iran’s calculus worked.  Hezbollah’s effective resistance and later victory (though limited and relative) dealt a major set-back to U.S. efforts to build an anti-Iranian Arab coalition.   Demonstrations were held in several Arab cities and towns, including Cairo, Egypt, in support of Hezbollah and the Lebanese people.  The governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia had to ‘reverse course’ and strongly condemn Israeli actions and criticize the United States for not putting a quick end to the conflict.

For all these reasons, a U.S. diplomatic approach aimed at ending Iran’s nuclear program will most probably fail and may even project an image of the United States as being weak, indecisive, and effectively incapable of further isolating Iran.

The New Prism to View the Middle East and the Iranian Threat
Unfortunately, and to this day, no consensus has emerged within the U.S. national security establishment on how to deal effectively with the global threat of extremist Islamism.  The key culprit for this lack of consensus is the old prism through which policymakers continue to view the Middle East.  The United States needs to look at the region through a totally different prism that is derived from greater and deeper cultural intelligence of the region.

Defining the Threat
In reality, extremist Islamism can be divided into two main categories, Sunni-based and Shiite-based.  A common mistake that one often witnesses in Washington is the constant mixing and/or linking of Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamists; for example, putting Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah in the same basket!
Let us analyze the threat to the United States that emerges from each type of extremist Islamism.

Sunni Extremist Islamism
There are numerous groups around the world that fall under this umbrella and tend to be loosely connected if at all.  They have, however, common features that distinguish them drastically from Shiite extremist Islamism and are as follows:
-    Strict interpretation of the Koran: these various Sunni groups believe that the door of Ijtihad was closed in the 12th century and should remain so today.  In other words, it is impossible in their eyes to find common ground between their version of Sunni Islam and an international order that governs today’s modern world.
-    Suicide ideology: these Sunni groups justify the use of suicide bombings against civilians as a mean of martyrdom in fighting the infidel.
-    Record of terrorism: these Sunni groups have been responsible for almost every Islamist suicide terrorist bombing throughout the world since the Eighties.  The record includes bombings in Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and most importantly, the United States on September 11th.
-    Worldwide ideology:  Sunni extremist Islamist groups are aggressively recruiting Sunni Moslems from around the world, especially the West, to create cells that could in the future destabilize those countries from within.  Furthermore, they are endeavoring to establish extremist Islamist governments and/or safe heavens within countries such as Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, or Somalia in order to sustain their struggle into the future.
-    Nuclear ambitions: Sunni extremist Islamist groups consider Pakistan’s nuclear bomb to be their own.  Their only goal is to one day put their hands on that power and use it against the infidels.

In summary, Sunni extremist Islamism is a global non-centralized revolutionary movement, is responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11th and all other major Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide, is aggressively pursuing the radicalization of Sunni Moslems in Western countries so they can become a destabilizing force in the future, is fiercely fighting the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is looking forward to the day it can put its hands on the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and detonate dirty bombs in the United States and around the world (wherever it deems it necessary).

Shiite Extremist Islamism
This form of Islamist extremism is very different from the Sunni one and has the following key features:
-    Iran centered:  although Shiite groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon are relatively quite autonomous they are much more connected to the Iranian regime than Sunni extremist groups are to a single government.
-    Open interpretation of the Koran: Shiite Islamist groups believe that Ijtihad and Tafseer are permitted in Islam enabling them to adapt their beliefs to different situations as they see fit.  Such adaptations may vary dramatically from the narrowest views on social mores to the most open ones.  For example, in Hezbollah controlled areas in Lebanon, one can easily see totally covered women walking side by side with women dressed in western clothing without any head or face covering.
-    Suicide ideology:  Shiite extremist Islamist groups have justified suicide bombings as acts of martyrdom and have condoned them only when they are conducted against military and government installations of an occupying enemy on occupied land.  In other words, a suicide bombing against an Israeli target can be justified if it takes place in Lebanon but cannot be justified if carried out outside Lebanon.  Furthermore, suicide bombings targeting civilians in cafes, discotheques, shopping centers, etc. are, for the time being, totally forbidden.
-    Record of terrorism: the terrorism record of Shiite extremist Islamism is very small in comparison to the Sunni one.  The two major terrorist attacks attributed to Shiite extremist Islamism were both in Lebanon and took place 26 years ago (U.S. Embassy bombing in April 1983 and the U.S. Marines compound bombing in October of the same year.  The Marines compound was blown-up along with the French military compound).  Although Hamas receives support from Iran in its struggle against Israel, Hamas’ terrorist actions against Israeli civilians are carried out by Sunni extremist Islamists.
-    Self-preservation ideology: Shiite extremist Islamism is driven mainly by the need to preserve Shiite Islam and the struggle for Shiite emancipation in Sunni governed countries.  Unlike Sunni extremist Islamism which advocates a transnational ideology that aims at establishing a different world order that suits their Islamic views, Shiite Islamism is more nationalistic in nature.
-    Nuclear ambition: Iran is seeking the bomb for its own security and Shiite extremist Islamism may very well make use of it under certain circumstances.

In summary, Shiite extremist Islamism is driven by nationalism, is relatively centered on Iran, does not have worldwide ideological ambitions, has not carried out terrorist attacks in recent times, is more focused on the emancipation of Shiites within Islam rather than fighting the infidels, and is pursuing a nuclear weapon that it may use if necessary.

Defeating the Threat
The fight against extremist Islamism will be long and hard and will at times present dangers and challenges as great if not greater than those witnessed during the Cold War against the Soviet Union.  The United States cannot afford to walk away from this fight and the threat of extremist Islamism, whether Sunni or Shiite based, must be defeated.  The question is how?

Option I: Solve the Palestinian Problem
There is no doubt that solving the Palestinian problem would remove major complicating factors in the fight against extremist Islamism but will not bring the fight to an end.  Let me explain.

Sunni extremist Islamism has an ideology that goes beyond the Palestinian cause.  It has placed the plight of Palestinians under the same umbrella as the plight of Moslems in India, Chechnya, Bosnia, China, Europe, America and Arab countries who are being mistreated in a world dominated by the United States.  Resolving the Palestinian issue would weaken the case for Sunni extremist Islamism but not put an end to it.  Furthermore, the fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the Taliban would most certainly continue so would the fighting in Somalia and other parts of Africa and Asia.

On the other hand, Shiite extremist Islamism as I explained earlier is driven by nationalistic and discrimination factors.   The Palestinian problem has been successfully used by Iran to counter U.S. efforts aimed at isolating it in the region.  Solving the Palestinian problem would most definitely weaken Iran’s efforts in countering an anti-Iranian Arab coalition but would not stop it from pursuing its nuclear program, which is driven as I stated earlier by national security concerns.

Furthermore, given the priorities of the current Israeli government and the general feelings of Israelis today, it is almost impossible at this point to move effectively forward on the Palestinian-Israeli peace track.  Irrespective of who bears greater responsibility for the breakdown in Palestinian-Israeli peace talks and who is to be blamed and for what, Israeli public perceptions at this moment are skeptical of any concessions to Palestinians to the point of cynicism.  In their view, whether right or wrong, every Israeli territorial concession has been met with more Arab violence; the latest concession being the withdrawal of Gaza which was met with rockets fired by Hamas on Israeli towns.  Having said that, I believe it is imperative that the United States jumpstart the peace process as quickly as possible.  This, however, requires a new strategy that is based on viewing the region through a new prism (which will be Part III of this series).  In summary, this option, though effectively dead at this stage, can ease the pressure on the U.S. in the fight against extremist Islamism but does not solve the problem.

Option II: Confront both Threats Simultaneously
Given the realities outlined above, if the United States were to fight Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamism simultaneously, the results could be devastating to the region, oil security and long term interests of the West.  Both streams of Islamism might unite in their efforts and create horrific chaos in the Middle East and South and Central Asia.  A renewed but much more aggressive wave of terrorism would shake European cities and sooner rather than later reach U.S. shores.  While no one could predict the final outcome of such a confrontation, the cost of such confrontation would be horrendous.

Option III: Drive a Wedge between Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamism
In the absence of a solution to the Palestinian problem, such a strategy would have very little impact on the overall threat and does not drastically change the environment on the ground.  Furthermore, if conflict were to erupt between these two streams of extremist Islamism, it would probably spread to the entire Gulf region threatening oil security and long term U.S. interests.

Option IV: A “Kissinger/Nixon” Approach
The fourth option is based on the approach used by the United States in its fight against Communism.  Kissinger and Nixon determined that it would be in the U.S. best interest to drive Communist China away from Communist Russia by seeking to formulate a long term partnership with the one that represented the least ideological long term threat to the United States, namely China.  In facing extremist Islamism, the United States could seriously consider developing a rapprochement with the one stream of Islamism that presents the least long term threat to U.S. interests – Shiite extremist Islamism, and therefore, Iran.  There is one more important point.  Iran is a country with a long and rich civilization that has endured 30 years of Shiite extremist Islamism.  This form of Islamism has already evolved during the past three decades.  It is now a matter of time before Iran reaches a point of equilibrium between its Shiite identity and its rich and diverse civilization.  It is interesting to note for example that in Lebanon, Hezbollah has already rejected the idea of an Islamic Republic and agreed in February 2006 to a consensual democracy in Lebanon.  By contrast, Sunni extremist Islamism in Lebanon is still advocating the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.

A New Strategy towards Iran
If the United States were to adopt the fourth option outlined above, it would have to be willing and ready to engage Iran with the aim of developing a strategic partnership that would eventually bring about effective Iranian support for U.S. initiatives in the region and provide U.S. assurances to alleviate Iranian security concerns.  It is in this spirit and within this context that the nuclear issue can be successfully addressed by the United States.  In addition, Iran can be of great support to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.  What about Israel?  Hasn’t Iran threatened the annihilation of the State of Israel, denied the Holocaust and provided military and logistical support to Hamas and Hezbollah?

The threat to Israel from Iran is very real and cannot be minimized or dismissed.  If seen, however, through the new prism and within a different context, this threat could be dealt with much more effectively.  Let me explain.

While the Iranian Islamic revolution has always used vitriolic language against Israel and Zionism, the degree of aggressiveness has diminished remarkably since the terrorist attacks of September 11th until the summer of 2005.  During the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) attempts were made to explore possible détente between Israel and Iran.  The Bush Administration’s rebuffing of Iran’s extended hand and its rewarding of Iran’s cooperation in Afghanistan with an aggressive policy centered on regime change drove the Ayatollahs of Iran mad.  Their response to the United States was the election of Ahmadinejad to the Presidency in August 2005.  This explains why since, Iranian aggressive rhetoric against Israel, its denial of the Holocaust, the hosting of a conference entitled “A World without Zionism”, its threats of annihilating Israel, and its active support of Hamas have come about with such intensity.  If seen through this context and with this new prism, the Iranian nuclear and conventional threat, which are quite real, may be effectively dealt with through this new American strategy towards Iran.

Viewed through this new prism, one can also better understand why in the upcoming elections of June 12th, the Ayatollahs have allowed candidates to run for the Presidency who are critical of President Ahmadinejad’s stance on the nuclear issue and are advocating the normalization of relations with the United States.  The Ayatollahs are not quite sure what to make of President Obama’s intended overture towards Iran.  By allowing these candidates to run and be vocal on these national security issues, the Ayatollahs are sending the signal to Washington that they have heard President Obama.  If, however, Ahmadinejad as expected by many wins the elections, it means that the Ayatollahs want to test President Obama’s intentions first.

In closing, if the United States were to adopt a strategy aimed at forging a partnership with Iran, it would need to tread very carefully, be patient and show resolve because there is a lot of animosity and distrust on both sides, especially on the Iranian side.

Cultural intelligence matters!

In several Security Debrief posts published on this site in 2007 and 2008, I discussed the great urgency required by the United States to adopt a different strategy towards Pakistan and I also articulated the options and steps necessary to stop Pakistan’s fast slide towards instability.  Unfortunately, the United States has already missed the boat and time has run out for any “catching up” in policy and tactics.  Today, the world faces the stark and real possibility of Pakistan becoming a failed state and a haven for terrorism with potential nightmarish consequences.  Can this be stopped and what should the U.S. do about it?

What Went Wrong?

US policies towards Pakistan have failed and security has deteriorated dramatically in Afghanistan and Pakistan because the United States did not keeping its eye on the ball!  The source of terrorism and the threat to the world’s security has been, still is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism which has produced the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their likes, and has established bases of operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  It is not Iran.

Instead of focusing on developing strategies to curb and marginalize over time the influence of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism (the root cause of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the source of religious extremism that had inspired suicide bombings in Iraq, Israel, India, and Spain for example), the Bush Administration’s main efforts in its second term in office were aimed at isolating and destabilizing Iran while fighting Al Qaeda-in-Iraq.    The shift in focus produced confusing policies towards Pakistan and Afghanistan and provided the breathing space for Wahhabi Sunni extremists, the Taliban and Al Qaeda to reorganize their forces and restructure their tactics and engineer a major comeback in both countries.

Mission Focus: Defeat Wahhabi Extremism

Security conditions on the ground in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have reached a critical stage and time is running out.  Unless the United States switches gears immediately and adopts an aggressive policy aimed like a laser beam at defeating Wahhabi extremism in both countries, the world better brace itself at having to face two failed states – Pakistan and Afghanistan -  in the very near future.  The “key” to success will depend on having one integrated regionally-based comprehensive strategy towards both countries, otherwise failure is most certain.

Pakistan

The development of a new integrated strategy requires greater cultural intelligence. In this case, religion plays a paramount role in identifying the solution to the problem.  Let me explain.

The overwhelming majority of the people of Pakistan are Moslem or follow Moslem traditions.  It is important to note that Islamic values and practices color virtually all aspects of Pakistani life and society with most Pakistanis being Sunni Moslem (there is a Shiite minority comprising approximately 14% of the population).  The majority of Sunni Moslems in Pakistan adhere to the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam.  There are four major schools of Sunni jurisprudence in Islam namely Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali.  The Hanafi School of Islam is “relatively” the most liberal of the four.  In addition, many Moslems in Pakistan are influenced by Sufism, a more mystical form of Islam.  Although Islam plays a central role in the life of most Pakistanis it was not subverted by violent extremists because of its Hanafi and Sufi influences.

The real problem lies with the spread of the Wahhabi Sunni movement (founded in Arabia) more particularly, among the Pashtun tribes located along the border with Afghanistan.  Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Saudi Arabia provided relief and humanitarian assistance to Pakistan in order to care for the large number of Afghani refugees who crossed the border into Pakistan in search of safety and shelter.  In addition, Saudi Arabia funded the construction of thousands of “madrassas” (religious schools) in those areas which indoctrinated the local population in Wahhabi Sunni Islam.  Over time, these schools became the breeding grounds for fanatical ideologies espoused by extremist groups (notably Al Qaeda and the Taliban) in the region of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, and other parts of the country.

Any strategy aimed at eliminating the threat of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism must have a religious component at its core in order to be effective.  The United States should do the following:

•    United Pakistan Against Wahhabism: the United States should encourage the formation of a national unity government in Pakistan that represents all non-Wahhabi Moslem components of society including the Pakistan Muslim League (N) led by Nawaz Sharif and declare war on a sect that has infected Pakistani society and is threatening the noble soul of Islam.  Under the banner of Pakistani Islam, the country may be better enabled to unite itself and mobilize its population and resources in defense of Pakistan and the Pakistani way of life.
•    US Lower Profile: the United States should lower its military profile and refrain from making statements that are interpreted by Pakistanis as undue interference in their internal affairs.  The struggle against Sunni Wahhabism must be based on Pakistani nationalism and driven by Pakistani society and forces.  Furthermore, while the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of real concern to the United States and the world, it is recommended that the Obama Administration address these concerns very quietly with the Pakistani military in order to avoid embarrassing Pakistan on an issue that is of great pride to the Pakistani people.
•    India’s Support:  the Obama Administration should discretely secure an understanding with India that provides full support to a national unity government of Pakistan in its push against Sunni Wahhabism.  After all, a ‘failed state’ in Pakistan is of greatest concern to India, given the protracted conflict over Kashmir and the infiltration of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism in Indian Moslem society.  This arrangement would free the hands of the Pakistani government enabling it to employ all of its resources against the Taliban and their allies in the North-West Province and Baluchistan regions of the country.

Afghanistan

The second major part of a new integrated and comprehensive strategy to defeat the real enemy – Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism – centers on Afghanistan.

Virtually all the people of Afghanistan are Moslem with a 75% majority adhering to the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam and approximately 24% of the population are Shiite Moslems, particularly the Hazara and Kizilbash.  Sufism is also widely practiced among Sunnis and Shiites alike in Afghanistan.  While at first glance one may be tempted to think that since the majority religion is Hanafi Sunni, maybe a strategy similar to the one being proposed for Pakistan could also be adapted to Afghanistan.  The answer is no because conditions in Afghanistan are much more complex than in Pakistan.  Although religion holds an important position in the daily life of most Afghanis, divisions along cultural and ethnic lines are quite dominant.  Let me explain.

The Pashtun ethnic group heavily centered in the southern province of Kandahar comprises less than two-fifths of the population and does not constitute a majority.  Tajiks account for approximately 25 percent of Afghanis, the Hazara comprise nearly 20 percent, and Uzbeks and Chahar Aimaks each account for slightly more than 5 percent of the population.  Furthermore, the official languages of Pakistan are Pashto and Persian (Dari).  Approximately two-fifths of the population speaks Pashto (the language of the Pashtuns) but more than half of the population speaks some dialect of Persian (Dari).

The complex religious, ethnic and linguistic mosaic of Afghanistan makes the development of a more coherent strategy against Sunni Wahhabism more difficult but not impossible.  We need to first understand the status of the Taliban in this complex picture.

The Taliban, whose ranks came originally from the Saudi funded Sunni Wahhabi madrassas in northern Pakistan, became a real force in Afghanistan in 1990’s following the withdrawal of Soviet troops.  Their main power base within Afghanistan is in the southern province of Kandahar among the Pashtun ethnic group.  Having taken over the government of Afghanistan in the nineties, the Taliban provided a safe haven for Sunni Wahhabi militants from around the world, including Al Qaeda headed by exiled Saudi Arabian Osama Bin Laden.  Resistance to Taliban power in Afghanistan came primarily from non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, whose power bases are in the north, west, and central parts of the country.  The Northern Alliance, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud (assassinated by Al Qaeda on September 9, 2001, two days before 9/11), grouped local leaders from those regions and ethnic groups of the country in opposition to the Taliban.  The alliance was supported: by India because of their rivalry with Pakistan; by Iran because of their opposition to a strong Sunni Taliban government; and, by Russia and Tajikistan because of the growing Islamic movements in Chechnya and Central Asia.

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by the Unites States and NATO aimed at removing the Taliban from power and going after Al Qaeda.  Having succeeded in toppling the Taliban government and establishing a new government in Kabul, the Bush Administration ‘lost’ focus in its second term.  Instead of pursuing an aggressive policy aimed at neutralizing the long term impact of the Taliban and their Sunni Wahhabi extremist allies, the United States shifted its attention to neutralize Iran’s rising regional influence.  This change in policy focus caused a major setback to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and led to the gradual re-emergence of the Taliban as a power and a major threat to stability in that country.

As in the case of Pakistan, the Obama Administration needs to adopt a strategy that has the single aim of defeating Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism in Afghanistan.  Given all the background information provided above, the recommended strategy is as follows:

•    New “Northern Alliance” Against Wahhabism:  the United States should encourage the formation of a new ‘Northern Alliance’ made up of all non-Pashtun ethnic groups who are vehemently opposed to the Taliban.  A new national government would be formed that brings on board non-Wahhabi Pashtuns and that has at its core this new Northern Alliance.  The defeat of the Taliban and Sunni Wahhabism must take precedence and should not be sacrificed for the sake of seeking greater accommodation with the Pashtuns.
•    India and Tajikistan:  India and Tajikistan have provided military and logistical support in the past to the old Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban.  The Obama Administration should reach out to these two countries and develop a coordinated effort to support the new Afghani government’s policy to defeat the Taliban.  It is in both countries’ national interest, and even most especially India, to have Sunni Wahhabism defeated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
•    Iran: Iran was the one country most actively engaged in supporting the old Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban during the nineties.  Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the aim of removing the Taliban from power and destroying Al Qaeda.  Iran was quite supportive of the American effort:
o    Military and Rescue Support: Iran continued providing weapons to the opposition Northern Alliance, closed its border with Afghanistan, and in response to a request from the Bush Administration, agreed to rescue any American military personnel in distress in its territory.
o    Formation of new Afghanistan Government: after the toppling of the Taliban government, U.S. and Iranian diplomats met together in Bonn to discuss the formation of a new government and constitution for Afghanistan.  “None was more [helpful] than the Iranians,” said James Dobbins, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan at the time, writing in the Washington Post. “The original version of the Bonn agreement … neglected to mention either democracy or the war on terrorism. It was the Iranian representative who spotted these omissions and successfully urged that the newly emerging Afghan government be required to commit to both.”

The United States should build on this constructive past experience and engage in a serious dialogue with Iran because the defeat of the Taliban and Sunni Wahhabism are in the interest of both countries, especially Iran.

The Iraq Challenge

An intensified and well-focused effort on defeating Sunni Wahhabism in Pakistan and Afghanistan requires, as stated earlier, the active involvement of regional powers such as India and Iran but also requires a U.S. shift in military, logistical and economic resources away from Iraq towards the Pakistani-Afghani theatre of operations.  An orderly and effective drawdown of U.S. military assets in Iraq necessitates a region-based security arrangement with Iraq’s key neighbors namely Iran, Turkey and Syria.  Of the three, Iran is most important in order to secure stability in Iraq, post U.S. withdrawal, and to insure the non-resurgence of Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism and Al Qaeda.

Iran and the Netanyahu Opportunity

In this long term war against Sunni Wahhabism Iran could potentially be one of the most reliable regional partners for the United States.  But how can the U.S. engage Iran given past hostilities, the nuclear agenda, Iran’s support to Hamas and Hezbollah, and Iranian leadership threatening to “wipe Israel off the map”?

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has effectively facilitated the opening for the United States to engage Iran. Let me explain.

On March 29, 2009, two days before he was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu in an interview with the Atlantic was quoted as saying “The Obama Presidency has two great missions: fixing the economy, and preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.”  Netanyahu also said in the same interview that he would support President Obama’s decision to engage Iran, so long as negotiations brought about a quick end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “How you achieve this goal is less important than achieving it,” he said.

The Washington Post published an article on April 22, 2009, in which it stated that Israel would not move ahead on the core issues of Palestinian peace talks until it sees progress in U.S. efforts to stop Iran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear arms and to limit Tehran’s rising influence in the region.  “It’s a crucial condition if we want to move forward,” Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon, a former ambassador to the United States, told The Washington Post. “If we want to have a real political process with the Palestinians, then you can’t have the Iranians undermining and sabotaging.”

When asked about those Israeli comments at a testimony hearing in front of the House Appropriations Committee on April 23, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated “For Israel to get the kind of strong support it’s looking for vis-à-vis Iran it can’t stay on the sideline with respect to the Palestinians and the peace efforts, that they go hand-in-hand.”

Some analysts have interpreted Secretary Clinton’s remarks as implicitly rejecting the emerging position of Netanyahu’s government and others have predicted that American and Israeli priorities were no longer in sync.  In reality, however, by putting Iran ahead of Palestinian peace talks on Israel’s list of top priorities, Prime Minister Netanyahu has opened the door for the Obama Administration to move as quickly as possible towards engaging Iran in a serious dialogue that may bring peace of mind and security to Israel.

While it is true that Iran is providing support to Hamas, it is important to keep in mind that this support is based on convenience much more than anything else.  Hamas was cut off by Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt after it seized power in Gaza through a military coup and sought support from anywhere, including Iran.  This support, can easily end if and when circumstances, vis-à-vis Hamas, were to change.  The real long term problem for Israel, however, is the ideology of suicide bombing aimed at killing innocent civilians, which is espoused by core elements of Hamas and other extremist Islamist Palestinian factions.

In other words, while Israel considers Iran’s nuclear agenda its top immediate security priority, Israel also knows that the long term threat to its security comes from the ideology of Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism that rejects any accommodation with Israel and indoctrinates the hatred of the Jews in its teachings.  It is this ideology, and not Iran, that has produced suicide bombings in Israel, Iraq, India, Spain and the United Kingdom.

In summary, the opening presented by Prime Minster Netanyahu must be seized by the Administration with the goal of reaching an arrangement with Iran on multiple fronts that are all inter-related, namely Israel’s security, Iraq’s stability, Pakistan’s recovery and Afghanistan’s liberation.

Eye on the Ball

Stopping Pakistan’s slide into chaos depends on adopting this new integrated comprehensive strategy, and the success of this new strategy depends on keeping two factors constant: preserve mission focus (the defeat of the real enemy – Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism), and secure regional engagement.

Cultural Intelligence matters!

•    Iraq: having helped bring the Shiites to power (for the first time in more than 800 years in an Arab country) along with the Kurds, the Bush Administration lost the trust of both communities by pursuing the policies of the past.
•    Iran: with the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, in a US military operation dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom, Iran cooperated constructively with the United States setting the stage for a possible new opening in relations between both countries.  Instead of building on this experimental new relationship, the Bush Administration declared Iran part of an Axis of Evil in 2002 and shunned Iranian signals for cooperation in 2003 following the Iraqi invasion.  As a result, the region faces today a much more belligerent Iran.
•    Syria: by removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, the United States got rid of Syria’s most bitter Arab enemy.  Instead of exploring a new policy towards Syria based on common interests in Iraq, the Bush Administration pursued a policy of antagonism towards Syria.  Result: another great opportunity was lost.
•    Palestine: instead of employing the immediate effect of “Shock and Awe” to its fullest advantage — by quickly re-engaging in a strong push for peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians — the Bush Administration totally ignored that conflict leaving the Palestinians in a further state of psychological despair.  Result: Hamas came to power.
•    Lebanon: in 2005, the United States was presented with an extraordinary opportunity for change in Lebanon.  Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon and the most popular Christian leader, Michel Aoun, with very close ties to the Shiites, returned to Lebanon from France where he had been in exile since 1990.  Instead of seizing this new opportunity and designing a new approach towards Lebanon, the Bush Administration pursued the same old policies of the past.  Result: attempts to disarm Hezbollah through pressure and by military means backfired giving Hezbollah increased power and stature in Lebanon.

In summary, the Bush Administration, who truly destroyed the “old political order” in the Middle East, failed to take full advantage of the engendered change  to further US interests in that region because it failed to view the region through a new prism.  Ironically, President Obama, who had opposed the invasion of Iraq in the first place, is best poised at this moment in history to take full advantage of the “change” ushered in by his predecessor; and, his administration can now design new policies reflective of the new realities of the Middle East.   In fact, the Obama Administration has an extraordinary opportunity today to help advance US interests in the Middle East in ways unthinkable of few years ago.  This, however, requires a look at the region through a new prism, which is the focus of this multi-part series commencing with a fresh look at Syria.

Syria vis-à-vis Iraq

Syria has viewed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 with great ambivalence.  On the one hand, the Syrian regime welcomed the removal of Saddam Hussein, its most bitter enemy, and felt more at ease with an Iraq ruled primarily by a Shiite-led coalition.  On the other hand, Syria feared that the potential religious strife between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq might spill over into Syria endangering its own stability.   Given Syria’s attitude and the Bush Administration’s focus on “regime change”, it was impossible for Syria and the United States to find common ground.  What about now?

The Obama Administration seems determined to withdraw US combat forces from Iraq by the end of 2010.  In order to secure that objective peacefully and in an orderly fashion, the United States must ensure that no security vacuum emerges as a result of its troop withdrawal.  Many experts, pundits and members of Congress in Washington are under the impression that the “surge” had succeeded and that US withdrawal can, therefore, take place with relative ease.  WRONG!  The surge in troops in 2007 along with the new alliance struck between Sunni tribes and the United States have definitely contributed to a dramatic reduction of violence in Iraq.  This success, however, is still tactical and not strategic for two major reasons:

•    the fundamental differences between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds in Iraq have not yet been bridged thereby, threatening a resurgence in religious and ethnic violence following the departure of US troops; and
•    Iraq’s neighbors (Iran, Turkey, and Syria) have not reached any understanding among themselves on whether to act individually or in concert if violence were to explode in Iraq post US withdrawal.

A withdrawal of US troops from Iraq that does not bring about religious and ethnic civil war is today in the interest of both the United States and Syria.  By looking at Syria through this new prism, the United States can more constructively engage Syria on Iraq and bring successful closure to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Syria vis-à-vis Lebanon

The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005 represented an extraordinary change in Syrian attitudes towards Lebanon.  Unfortunately, most experts in the United States have failed to understand the magnitude and depth of that change in Syrian policy because they continued to look at Syria through the old prism – i.e. since Syria has always had territorial and political expansionist ambitions at the expense of Lebanon, its military withdrawal from Lebanon must, therefore, be tantamount to a tactical maneuver void of any fundamental change in Syrian attitude, period.  In reality, however, Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon was truly strategic.  Let me explain.  The year 2005 presented Syria with a nightmarish situation: the possibility of Syria getting sucked into civil conflict in both Iraq and Lebanon at the same time.

Iraq in 2005 presented the most serious long term threat to Syrian stability because a Sunni-Shiite war in neighboring Iraq could have a devastating effect on Syria’s internal security.  Syria had to : 1) closely monitor its border with Iraq to prevent the possible infiltration of its territory by Al Qaeda and/or Sunni insurgency groups; and, 2) also design military contingency plans vis-à-vis a chaotic Iraq.  The presence of 40,000 of its troops in Lebanon was becoming a hindrance.   On the other hand, the situation in Lebanon, following the assassination in 2005 of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, was on the verge of becoming explosive.  Serious allegations of Syrian involvement in the killing of Hariri poisoned relations with the Sunni community of Lebanon and paved the way for a burgeoning uprising by the Lebanese against Syrian presence in Lebanon.  Syria was at a crossroads.  If it were to stick to its previous policy towards Lebanon, it would most certainly face upheaval and be drawn into a new protracted religious conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon.  To the Lebanese Sunnis, Syria became the enemy, and to the Shiites, Syria was the ally that could protect them from Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism.  Alternatively, if Syria were to withdraw its troops from Lebanon it would:

•    Enhance Syria’s capabilities to deploy troops along the Iraqi border if necessary
•    Avoid an upheaval in Lebanon;
•    Appease rather than enflame Sunni-Shiite tensions in Lebanon;
•    Preserve rather than endanger its alliance with the Shiites in Lebanon; and
•    Neutralize the animosity of Lebanese Christians.

It became clear to Syria that the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon in 2005 would bring it “real” security.  The strategic choice was cast.  By viewing Syria through this new prism, the United States can design a much more constructive and successful policy towards Lebanon.

Syria vis-à-vis Palestine

While the Palestinian Authority (PA) is nominally in charge of the West Bank today, its leadership over the Palestinian population is quite shaky.  In fact, if elections were to be held today in the West Bank, the PA may very well lose!  In Gaza, in spite of the 22-day long Israeli military offensive code named Operation Cast Lead that was launched on December 27, 2008, Hamas is still in charge of Gaza.  Although Hamas has been weakened militarily to a great extent, it has gained more political and moral support among Palestinians and Arabs in general.  On a regional level, the biggest political loser has been Egypt and the biggest winner has been Syria.  Egypt lost a lot of support in the Arab and Moslem worlds because it sealed its borders with Gaza during the war and was seen as “assisting’ Israel in its military operation.  While Egypt has been instrumental in securing “ceasefires’ between Hamas and Israel, it is Syria who enjoys among all Arab countries the greatest political leverage and trust with Hamas.  If Hamas is here to stay and if the Obama Administration is serious about pushing forward peace negotiations between Palestinian and Israelis, there will come a point in time where some form of accommodation with Hamas will have to take place.  How and under what circumstances remain to be seen; but Syria is best positioned to facilitate such a process when the time is right.

Pundits and experts in Washington keep talking about Iranian-backed Hamas; it’s sounding like a broken record!  The exiled leadership of Hamas is in Syria, not in Iran.  While Iranian support is important to Hamas, it is Syrian support and influence that are most significant and have the greatest impact on Hamas and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  As long as Hamas is a player, Syria’s role could be most constructive in any renewed serious peace effort.

Syria vis-à-vis Iran

Syria has forged a close relationship with Iran in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Saddam Hussein’s war on Iran in 1980.  This relationship may become quite useful to the United States in any future engagement with Iran.

Conclusion

Syria has a direct interest in cooperating with the United States on many fronts (as discussed above), especially in Iraq, the most pressing of all policy priorities for the Obama Administration at this time.  Both countries are interested in seeing a stable Iraq following US troop withdrawal and both countries consider Al Qaeda a regional threat.  By viewing Syria through this new prism, it becomes quite apparent to the United States that much could be accomplished between Washington and Damascus through constructive engagement.   There is one key point for US policymakers to remember and keep in mind when designing approaches to Syria:  a more secure and confident Syria can be of great assistance to the United States, while a weakened or threatened Syria can be a major obstacle to US interests.